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USSR REPORT

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Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

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CONVERTING OF SOVIET ECONOMY TO WARTIME STATUS EXAMINED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 24 Aug 84) pp 3-11

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, MSU S. Kurkotkin, deputy minister of defense and chief of the rear services of the USSR Armed Forces: "Converting the National Economy From Peacetime to Wartime Status During the Years of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] Converting the national economy from a peacetime to wartime status (mobilizing the economy) consists, as is known, in reorganizing all the economic sectors and appropriate state institutions in the nation for organizing mass production of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, uniforms, supplies and other materiel for the all-round support of the Armed Forces, the activities of the state and the population in the course of the war.

The mobilizing of the Soviet economy started fully only with the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. However, during the prewar years, the Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, successfully carried out the tasks of increasing the nation's military-economic potential, broadening military production, preparing the economy for a military reorganization and increasing its survivability.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government saw the approaching threat of war and took proper measures to strengthen the state's defense capability.

During the years of the first five-year plans, the Communist Party, in consistently following the instructions of V. I. Lenin that a war must be prepared for "over a long period of time, seriously, starting from an economic upswing in the nation"¹ did everything to more rapidly surmount its technical and economic backwardness inherited from Tsarist Russia. The industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture and the cultural revolution played an enormous role in strengthening the Soviet state's economic and defense might. As a result of the measures taken, Soviet national income over the period from 1928 through 1940 increased by more than 5-fold, electric power production rose by 9.7-fold, coal mining by 4.7-fold, steel casting by more than 4-fold, oil output by 2.7-fold, while machine products increased by 20-fold.²

A characteristic feature in Soviet economic development during the prewar years was that military production developed at a higher pace than industry as a

whole. Thus, while during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan, all industrial product increased by 2.2-fold, defense products rose by 3.9-fold. The average annual production of airplanes and tanks in 1935-1937 rose by over 4-fold in comparison with 1930-1931, for artillery pieces it was 2.6-fold and for rifles by almost 2.3-fold.³

In line with the greater immediate threat of attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, measures were taken to increase the state food reserves and major strategic materials. Just from January 1939 through January 1941, the state reserves and mobilization supplies were increased by 5-fold for iron, 2-fold for rolled product, more than 2-fold for copper and 2.2-fold for zinc.⁴ The Politburo of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee at this time adopted a number of decrees to broaden military production, including: "On the Production of T-34 Tanks in 1940," "On the Reconstruction of Existing Aircraft Plants and the Construction of New Ones" and others.

Time was of the essence. In the West the flames of World War II had already broken out. Their glow was approaching the frontiers of the USSR. The nation, in straining every muscle, strengthened its economic and defense might. In just 3½ years of the Third Five-Year Plan, 3,000 new large industrial enterprises were built, including: metallurgical and copper smelting, oil refineries and automotive plants as well as pulp-paper combines and building materials plants. Tank, aviation and artillery plants as well as plants producing ammunition went into operation.⁵

In creating the industrial potential, the necessity of the rational placement and military-economic dispersement of national economic capacity was taken into account. Industry was brought closer to the raw material and fuel sources located largely in the Eastern regions of the USSR. During the years of the Third Five-Year Plan, the basic emphasis was put on establishing military-industry facilities in the Volga, the Urals and Siberia.

Of major importance for increasing the viability of the economy was the duplicating of unique enterprises located in the European USSR in the East of the nation. Thus, ferroalloy plants, aluminum-magnesium enterprises and so forth were built in Kuznetsk (now Novokuznetsk) and in the Urals.

Due to the comprehensive program for improving military-economic potential, by the summer of 1941, the industrial enterprises of the Urals, the Volga, Western and Eastern Siberia as well as Central Asia and the Far East were producing 18.5 percent of the military product but for the basic types this figure surpassed 34 percent.⁶ In building new plants, production envisaged the possibility of rapidly converting them to turning out military products. Many enterprises received mobilization plans.

As a result of the successful fulfillment of the plans of the prewar five-year plans, the economic and defense might of the nation increased immeasurably. The Soviet Union emerged in first place in Europe and second in the world for the volume of machine building products, for tractor production, oil production, for the volume of railroad shipments, and second place in Europe for the production of electric power, steel, iron and aluminum. The nation established its own aviation, tank and artillery industries. The defense industry developed

particularly intensely during the 3 prewar years with the production level in this sector rising by more than 4-fold.

However, it was impossible to fully carry out the complex military-economic tasks confronting the nation from the threat of the initiating of a war by the Nazi bloc against the world's first socialist state. History had left too little time for the Soviet people to prepare to repel aggression. Nevertheless, the measures undertaken by the Communist Party and the Soviet government to strengthen national defense might made it possible to significantly shorten the time for switching the nation's economy to a war footing.

The treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR forced the Soviet people to shift from peaceful labor to waging a holy war to defend their motherland. During its very first days the Communist Party worked out a program for mobilizing all the forces to defeat the Nazi invaders. It was based upon the immortal ideas of V. I. Lenin on the defense of the socialist fatherland. The party was guided by the leader's instructions that once things had reached the point of a war, everything should be subordinate to the war and the slightest hesitation on this score cannot be tolerated. For this reason, as during the years of the Civil War, Lenin's slogan "Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory!" became the determinant in organizing the entire Soviet economy.

The advantages of the planned socialist economic system made it possible to quickly carry out a number of major measures to convert the nation's economy from a peacetime to a wartime status, namely:

- a) To initiate military production on an ever-increasing scale and provide the front with the necessary amount of weapons and military equipment;
- b) To shift the economic proportions in the interests of the greatest possible increase in the production of military products, to strengthen the military industry having shifted to it enterprises from other national economic sectors;
- c) To reorganize the operation of transport, the communications agencies and equipment and strengthen the capacity of the railroads;
- d) To mobilize the material and labor resources of agriculture to continuously supply the Armed Forces and the population of the cities with food and industry with raw materials;
- e) To reallocate the human resources to ensure the mobilization requirements of the Armed Forces and the operation of industry and the other economic sectors;
- f) To change the activities of the scientific and experimental-design institutions in the aim of meeting the needs of the Armed Forces and attaining military-technical superiority over the enemy;
- g) To utilize the financial system, trade and enterprises in the service sphere in accord with the needs of the war;
- h) To increase the centralization of economic management in the aim of concentrating resources to meet the needs of the war and so forth.

The economy was mobilized in an organized manner, according to a specific plan. Under those very difficult conditions for the country, precise and efficient planning was of special importance. This was carried out considering the changes in the national economic proportions brought about by the needs of the front. This made it possible to successfully carry out the very complex tasks of supplying the operational army with combat equipment, weapons and other materiel. Thus, even on the second day of the war a mobilization plan was put into effect for the production of ammunition, a week later a mobilization national economic plan was approved for the third quarter of 1941, and in August, a military-economic plan which reflected the questions of mobilizing the economy for the fourth quarter of 1941 and for 1942 for the regions of the Volga, Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

The military-economic plans played a major role in mobilizing the economy. They became a major implement for converting our national economy to a wartime footing and in mobilizing USSR production potential for defeating the enemy.

The grandiosness of the tasks confronting the nation demanded changes in the forms and methods of leading and organizing economic management. For this reason the entire burden of authority was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee [GKO] established on 30 June 1941. The GKO decrees and decisions had the force of wartime laws for all the state, party, Komsomol and public bodies as well as for all citizens. Later on the Operations Bureau of the GKO was established and this supervised the routine activities of all the people's commissariats. This made it possible to pool the efforts of the front and the rear and more effectively utilize the resources for mobilizing the economy. Particular attention was paid to the questions of producing combat equipment, weapons, ammunition and fuel.

The situation during the first months of the war was exceptionally complex. But under these conditions socialist industry demonstrated its ability to rapidly satisfy the arising demand. Entire sectors of the national economy were converted to a wartime status. The plants of heavy, transport and agricultural machine building were converted to tank production while the medium machine building enterprises were to begin producing artillery pieces and mortar. The repair shops of plants and local industry and artisan cooperative enterprises were also converted to producing weapons and ammunition. For example, during the first days of the war 40 plants were involved in producing heavy tanks in Leningrad, 60 plants were producing regimental cannons, 15 were turning out medium machine guns, 16 were producing mortars while 7 plants were producing submachine guns. Some 116 enterprises were involved in the machining of shells and projectiles.⁷

The Communist Party and the Soviet government undertook decisive measures aimed at developing military production on an ever-increasing scale. Upon a decision of the party Central Committee, just during the last 4 months of 1941, 8 tank plants, 6 hull and 3 diesel tank plants were set up in the Volga and particularly in the Urals. The People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy from 1 August 1941 promised to begin producing armored plate at the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant. The people's commissariats of medium machine building and ferrous metallurgy were to immediately move the armor rolling mill from the Kirov to the Nizhniy Tagil Metallurgical Plant. The front needed airplanes, guns and mortars and ammunition just as much as tanks. At a price of enormous effort the workers

of the rear during the second half of 1941 increased the production of artillery pieces by almost 3-fold in comparison with the prewar 6 months, by 2.8-fold for tanks and 1.6-fold for airplanes.⁸ Military production rose significantly in the first half of 1942.

During the war years, the organization and starting up of the production of new types of weapons were carried out several times faster than prior to the war. Military production was widened by an unprecedented acceleration in its development rate. Thus, while prior to the war it took 2 or 3 years to build a blast furnace, during the war it took 7-8 months.

As is known, in the prewar years, the nation had begun building a large number of industrial enterprises. Under the conditions of the commenced war, a decision was taken to mothball the construction of certain enterprises and projects while others would be completed rapidly. The light industry sectors were significantly reorganized. Production was initiated widely of greatcoat cloth, as well as cotton and wool fabrics for the Armed Forces.

As a consequence of the occupation of a number of regions in the USSR, the national economy suffered enormous losses. Prior to the war, the territory temporarily occupied by the enemy by November 1941 had around 40 percent of the nation's population, it produced 63 percent of the coal, cast 68 percent of the iron, 58 percent of the steel, 60 percent of the aluminum, it produced 38 percent of the grain and had 41 percent of the total railroad length.⁹

From the very start of the war, the difficult task arose of shifting from the frontline areas the major enterprises, workers, engineers and technicians. Leadership over the implementing of these measures was entrusted to the Evacuation Council established on 24 June 1941 (chairman N. M. Shvernik, deputies A. N. Kosygin and M. G. Pervukhin).

Evacuation was carried out according to a precise plan. From July through November 1941, some 1,523 industrial enterprises were relocated to the East (667 to the Urals, 224 to Western Siberia, 78 to Eastern Siberia, 308 to Central Asia and Kazakhstan and 226 to the Volga). As a total during the second half of the year, according to incomplete data, the equipment of 2,593 industrial enterprises was moved from the threatened areas. The members of the VKP(b) Central Committee and government S. A. Akopov, B. L. Vannikov, V. V. Vakhrushev, A. N. Kosygin, V. A. Malyshev, M. G. Pervukhin, I. F. Tevosyan, D. F. Ustinov, A. I. Shakhurin and others were concerned with the questions of relocating and reestablishing the enterprises arriving in the rear of the nation.

Not only industrial enterprises were evacuated to the East. The kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the eastern regions of the nation during the second half of 1941 received 2,393,300 head of livestock shifted from the frontline zone.¹⁰

The shifting of the productive forces from the frontline areas deep into the rear made it possible to maintain a significant portion of national wealth and use this in the interests of carrying out the main tasks of increasing military production.

The moving over thousands of kilometers of what essentially was an entire industrial nation caused enormous strain in transport operations. The volume of operational shipments increased sharply. All of this necessitated a reorganization of transport operations and here a major element was to convert train traffic to a special military schedule called the "A" travel warrant. This envisaged the moving first of troop trains and freight involved with the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces. Other measures were also carried out envisaged by the mobilization plan. A special freight control system began to be employed in rail transport.

Due to the fact that transport was being evermore difficult tasks, its leadership had to be strengthened. In February 1942, under the GKO the Transport Committee was formed the membership of which included I. V. Stalin (chairman), A. A. Andreyev (deputy), A. I. Mikoyan, I. V. Kovalev, A. V. Khrulev, Z. A. Shashkov and others. With the aid of the Transport Committee, it was possible to achieve a greater coordination in the planning and carrying out of shipments and to coordinate the work of the means of transport. The GKO altered the management structure of the railroads and strengthened the leadership of the NKPS [People's Commissariat of Railroads]. On 25 March 1942, the USSR Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Chief of the Main Directorate of Rear Services of the Soviet Army, Gen A. V. Khrulev, became the head of the NKPS. Under the fronts positions were established for representatives of the NKPS. Responsible party workers and representatives of the NKPS were sent to accelerate troop train traffic to many junctions through which the main flows of military cargo were moving. Here also were the representatives of the chief of the rear services of the Soviet Army.

Due to these measures and the unstinting work of the railroad workers, shipments for the army and the national economy increased significantly. For just the 10 main lines, the volume of loading and unloading by the beginning of May 1942 had increased by 50 percent, car stoppages had declined noticeably and railroad capacity had increased.¹¹

Along with the measures taken to improve transport operations, the GKO and the USSR government gave great importance to mobilizing the material and labor resources in agriculture to continuously supply the Armed Forces with food and industry with raw materials. In order to carry out this task, it was essential to alter the procedure for distributing the food resources. The state channelled the existing food primarily to supply the Red Army and the population of the industrial centers. According to a decision of the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee, from July 1941, a rationing system began to be introduced. The amounts were set depending upon the degree of importance of the work performed for defense purposes as well as the nature of the job and working conditions.

The most important conditions for solving the food problem were the rapid reorganization of agricultural production to a wartime footing and controlling the placement of the production of grain and other agricultural products. In the spring of 1942, the planted area of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the regions of the Center, Volga, Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Transcaucasia and the Far East increased by 3.7 million hectares in comparison with 1940.¹²

Of great importance for compensating for losses in food production was the extensive use of additional sources including the subsidiary farms of industrial enterprises and rear troop units and which were specialized chiefly in the raising of potatoes and vegetables.

Regardless of the decline in agricultural production, the Soviet kolkhoz peasantry did everything possible and impossible not to remain in debt to the front. Agriculture was able under unbelievably difficult conditions to become a sound support for the front. Having mobilized the human and material resources, it made full use of its material and technical base and maintained the required food production level. At a price of unstinting effort, the rural workers provided the army and the population with food products and industry with raw materials.

Another difficult problem in mobilizing the economy was the reallocation of human resources to meet the mobilization requirements of the Armed Forces and the running of industry and the other economic sectors. With the outbreak of the war, millions of workers, kolkhoz members, engineers and technicians joined the ranks of the Army and Navy. A sharp reduction in the number of working-age population was also caused by the temporary occupation of a significant portion of Soviet territory. For this reason the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet government adopted a number of extraordinary measures to make more effective use of the personnel in the national economy and to seek out human reserves.

On 26 June 1941, the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the Working Hours of Manual and White Collar Personnel in Wartime" was promulgated. The leaders of the enterprises were granted the right, with the permission of the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] to set for employees compulsory overtime lasting from 1 to 3 hours a day. Regular and supplementary leaves were cancelled. This provided an opportunity to increase the load factor on the production equipment by approximately one-third without increasing the enterprise personnel.

For the correct and planned distribution and redistribution of labor resources, on 30 June 1941, under the Bureau of the USSR SNK, a committee was established for registering and allocating the labor force under the chairmanship of P. G. Moskatov who also headed the Main Directorate of Labor Resources. The republic SNK, the kray and oblast executive committees were given the right to effectively maneuver manpower in the interests of increasing military production.

From July 1941 through January 1942, the Committee for the Registration and Allocation of the Labor Force was able to shift into the defense industry from local industry enterprises, from the service sphere, industrial cooperatives and the municipal economy and mobilize from the unemployed population some 120,850 persons. Just in the second half of 1941, production received 500,000 housewives and 360,000 students of the 8th-10th grades. During this period, construction battalions and worker columns were actively organized. These were sent to coal mines, oil fields, power plants, to enterprises of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, to construction projects and railroad transport. The number of persons in these formations reached 608,500 persons.¹³

The organizing of accelerated production and technical training became a major task. In a short period of time an extensive network of minimum technical knowledge circles had been established and the number of trade and railroad schools increased. The Soviet women made an enormous contribution to strengthening defense might.

A major role was also played by Soviet scientists in solving the major problems of reorganizing the economy and setting up a smoothly operating military economy. The situation at that time demanded a change as rapidly as possible in the activities of the scientific and experimental-design institutions to meet the needs of the Armed Forces and for achieving military-technical superiority over the enemy. The scientists paid particular attention to improving various types of weapons and combat equipment. Scientists were at work on developing new, more advanced types of aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces and mortars. Their efforts resulted in efficient rocket weapons, while radar and other types of combat equipment were developed.

During the first, most difficult months of the Great Patriotic War, when the nation was deprived of many deposits of essential raw materials, the Soviet scientists carried out enormous work to seek out new raw material sources in the Eastern regions. The research contributed to the development of the productive forces in the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan. New deposits of ferrous and nonferrous metal ores, coal and oil were developed.

The needs of the war were broad and diverse. It had a significant impact on the functioning of the state's financial system, trade and the service sphere. Suffice it to say that in the second half of 1941, allocations for military purposes, in comparison with the first half of the year, had increased by 20.6 billion rubles and in 1942 they reached 108.4 billion rubles. The redistribution of foreign trade was also for the benefit of military production.

Thus, drawing on the advantages of the socialist national economic system, the Communist Party and the Soviet government were able to rapidly mobilize all the potential capabilities of the nation to carry out the primary task of rapidly establishing a smoothly-operating military economy. The greater centralization in national economic management made it possible to mobilize the material and financial means as well as the human resources of the nation and channel them into broadening military production and establishing a strong, organized rear.

The entire range of measures carried out by the Communist Party and the Soviet government to mobilize the economy could not help but tell on the time required to convert the national economy to a wartime status. By the heroic efforts of the Soviet people, by mid-1942, the war-production capacity lost during the first months of the war had been not only replaced but also significantly surpassed. Thus, the output of military products in the Urals rose, in 1942 in comparison with 1940, by more than 5-fold, in Western Siberia by 27-fold and the Volga area by 9-fold.¹⁴

For the sake of comparison, it might be pointed out that in Nazi Germany the converting of the economy to a military footing lasted almost 6 years, from 1933 through 1939. The mobilizing of the economy in the nations of the

anti-Hitler coalition, in particular the United States, was carried out in the course of the war and continued around 2 years. Here the United States at that time did not suffer any serious losses and its army was not engaged in active combat operations.¹⁵

The well organized Soviet military production from mid-1942 provided the troops with the necessary amount of equipment, weapons and other materiel. During this year the Soviet Army received over 25,400 aircraft of all types, around 24,500 tanks, 33,100 field guns (of a caliber of 76-mm and more), around 125,600 mortars and 127.4 million shells.¹⁶

This made it possible for the Soviet Supreme High Command to aim new military formations and establish a reserve of combat equipment, weapons and ammunition. This ensured the increased size and combat might of the Armed Forces and was a major prerequisite for a fundamental turning point in the course of the war.

In having a developing industrial base in the East of the nation, the Communist Party and the Soviet government established a rapidly growing, well organized military economy. This was a qualitatively new stage in the development of the Soviet economy making it possible to achieve a material and technical superiority in the difficult economic struggle against Nazi Germany.

The successful reorganization of the socialist national economy and the shifting of a significant portion of the nation's productive forces to the East in a short period of time were possible due to the unprecedented labor feat of the Soviet people led by the Communist Party.

The rapid conversion of the nation's economy from a peacetime to a wartime status showed that the socialist economic system was more mobile and maneuverable, it was able more quickly to adapt, to respond more effectively to the changing needs and utilize more effectively the material resources in the interests of meeting the needs of the front. The USSR was able with maximum efficiency to utilize each ton of metal, fuel, each unit of machine tool equipment.

The lessons of converting the nation's economy from a peacetime to a wartime status during the years of the last war provided numerous examples of effective, rational decisions and of the highest state, production and labor discipline showing the indisputable advantages of the socialist state's economy.

FOOTNOTES

¹ V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 395.

² KOMMUNIST, No 7, 1975, p 20.

³ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 12, 1982, p 154.

- ⁴ "Sovetskiy tyl v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [The Soviet Rear in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Mysl', Book 1, 1974, p 9.
- ⁵ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," Vol 12, p 154.
- ⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷ "Istoriya SSSR s drevneyskikh vremen do hashikh dney" [The History of the USSR From Ancient Times to Today], Moscow, Nauka, Vol 10, 1973, p 76.
- ⁸ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 81, inv. 12076, file 5, sheet 3.
- ⁹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," 1975, Vol 4, p 152.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., p 140.
- ¹¹ Ibid., p 148.
- ¹² "Velikaya pobeda sovetskogo naroda 1941-1945" [The Great Victory of the Soviet People 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1976, p 401.
- ¹³ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," Vol 4, p 144.
- ¹⁴ N. Voznesenskiy, "Voyennaya ekonomika SSSR v period Otechestvennoy voyny" [The Soviet Military Economy During the Period of the Patriotic War], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1948, p 77.
- ¹⁵ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 5, 1978, p 343.
- ¹⁶ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," Vol 5, p 48.

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WORLD WAR II: ORGANIZATION, CONDUCT OF TANK ENGAGEMENTS VIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 24 Aug 84) pp 12-21

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Professor, Mar Armored Trps O. Losik: "The Experience of Organizing and Conducting Major Tank Engagements During the Years of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] An engagement, as one of the forms of conducting military operations, arose during the wars of the slaveholding age (the engagements at Marathon in 490 B.C., at Gaugamela in 331 B.C. and at Cannae in 216 B.C., and others). Prior to the appearance of the concept of "operation" in military art, engagements were the basic form of employing the main forces of the belligerent armies in a theater of military operations and were employed right up until the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries (the engagement at Sheynovo in 1887, the Lioyang Engagement in 1904 and the Mukden Engagement in 1905). Here the engagements were conducted by infantry and cavalry forces and with the start of the employment of firearms also the artillery. Naval engagements occurred at sea.

An engagement, as an aggregate of attacks, combat and maneuver aimed at achieving the goals of an operation or carrying out its particular tasks, in our opinion, was finally developed during the years of World War II. As a consequence of the employment of aviation and air defenses, air and air defense engagements arose while the massed employment of armored and mechanized troops brought about tank engagements.

A tank engagement, in being a variety of an all-arms engagement, from the experience of the last war, differed from the latter in the fact that tank field forces (tank armies and tank groups) and individual tank and mechanized formations (tank, mechanized and motorized corps) comprised the basis of the groupings of opposing troops involved in them and their main strike force. These field forces and formations were given the mission of carrying out the main tasks at a given stage of a defensive or offensive operation.

Certain indicators for the individual, largest tank engagements from the period of the Great Patriotic War are given in the table. An analysis of them makes it possible to conclude that a majority of the engagements on both sides involved large troop groupings consisting of from 3 to 9 tank and motorized divisions of the Nazi Army and from 3 to 6 tank and mechanized corps of the Soviet

Table

Certain Indicators of Individual Tank Engagements from
the Period of the Great Patriotic War

Operation, time & place of engagement	Composition of groupings		Length of en- gag., dys.	Conditions of development & result of engagement
	Soviet	Nazi		
1	2	3	4	5
1. Defensive operation of SW Front, Jun 41, in area of Lutsk, Radekhov, Brody, Rovno	mc--6 rd--5	1TGr (md--2, td--4), id--7	7	In making counterstrike by front against enemy 1TGr. Meeting engagement & going over to defensive by Soviet troops
2. 2nd stage of Stalingrad Counter- offensive, Dec 42	mc--3, tc--2 rd--7	td--3, stb--1, id--4, air div. --1	11	In repelling attack by Army Group Goth on external perimeter of encirclement of Stalingrad grouping. Attack enemy grouping halted & Soviet troops went over to offensive on Kotelnikovo
3. Defensive operation of Voronezh Front, Jul 43, in area of Prokhorovka	5 Gds. TA (tc--4, mc--1), rd--4	4 TA (td--4), id--1	about 24 hrs.	During front counterstrike. Meeting engagement. Enemy pulled back to initial position
4. Belgorod-Kharkov Operation of Voronezh Front, Aug 43, in area of Bogodukhov	1 TA, 5 Gds. TA (tc--4, mc--2), rd--7	td--3, stb--2, id--5	3	In concluding stage of operation in repelling enemy counterstrike. Meeting engagement with subsequent going over of TA to defensive
5. Kiev Offensive Operation of 1st Uk. Front, Nov 43, in Fastov area	3 Gds. TA (tc--2, mc--1, sbr--1), rd--3	td--3, id--3	4	In concluding stage of operation in repelling enemy counterstrike. Meeting engagement with subsequent going over of 3 Gds. TA to defensive
6. Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation of 1st Uk. Front, Mar 44, on Ternopol, Proskurov line	3 Gds. TA, 4 TA (tc--3, mc--2), rd--9	td--9, id--6	10	In course of operation in repelling enemy counter- strike, Soviet tank armies temporarily went over to defensive, repelled counter- strike & resumed offensive
7. Korsun-Shevchenkovi- skiy Operation of 1st and 2d Uk. fronts, Feb 44, at Korsun- Shevchenkoviyskiy	6 TA (tc--1, mc--), 5 Gds. TA (tc--3), 2 TA (tc-- 1, sbr--1), rd--9	td--8, id--4	14	In repelling enemy counter- strike on external peri- meter. Defensive engage- ments

Table (con't.)

1	2	3	4	5
8. Belorussian Operation of 1st Belorussian Front, Aug 44, east of Warsaw	2 TA (tc--3)	td--5, id--1	7	Repelling counterstrike in concluding stage of operation. Defensive engagement
9. Vistula-Oder Operation of 1st Ukrainian Front, Jan 45, in area of Kielce	4 TA (mc--1, tc--1, sbr--1), rd--6	td--2, md--1, id--1	about 2.5	In repelling enemy counterstrike at start of operation. Meeting engagement. Enemy went over to defensive, then retreated

Key: tc--tank corps; mc--mechanized corps; rd--rifle division; sbr--separate tank brigade; md--mechanized division; td--tank division; id--infantry division; stb--separate tank battalion.

troops. Here the proportional amount of the tank and mechanized formations in relation to the rifle troops (in theoretical corps) participating together with them in the tank engagements were: 78.3 percent in the area of Lutsk, Radekhov, Brody and Rovno, 79.4 percent in the area of Prokhorovka, 79.7 percent in the area of Fastov, 62.5 percent on the line of Ternopol, Proskurov and 67.7 percent at Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy.

The duration of the tank engagements was extremely varied and lasted from 3 to 14 days. This depended upon the tasks being carried out by the opposing groupings, upon the size and combat capabilities of the men and weapons involved and upon the conditions of the outbreak and course of combat operations.

The conditions for the development of tank engagements during the war years differed. In certain offensive operations, such engagements occurred in the course of completing the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone and were often meeting engagements. An example could be the operations of the 4th Tank Army in the Kielce area in January 1945 against the XXIV Tank Corps of the Nazi troops. The reason which caused the development of this engagement was that the enemy was endeavoring by committing its operational reserves to check the advance of the main assault grouping of the First Ukrainian Front which included the 4th Tank Army.

Tank engagements also arose in the course of the development of operations. Thus, in the conducting of the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation (March 1944) by the troops of the First Ukrainian Front, the 3d Guards and 4th Tank Armies, in advancing in a southerly direction, created a real threat of having the main grouping of the front come out on the rear lines of communications of the Nazi Army Group South. Under these conditions, the Nazi Command on the line of Ternopol, Proskurov (now Khmel'nitskiy) committed major forces to an engagement consisting of 9 tank divisions and 6 infantry ones in the aim of making powerful counterstrikes against the Soviet troops and eliminating the arising threat.

For this reason the advance of both tank armies was temporarily halted in order to repel the counterstrike, bring up reserves and prepare a powerful attack to defeat the enemy grouping.¹ As a result, a tank engagement occurred.

Most frequently tank engagements arose in the concluding stage of offensive operations. They occurred, in particular, in conducting such offensive operations as the Belgorod-Kharkov, Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy, Belorussian, Budapest and Vistula-Oder. Major tank engagements were initiated and conducted also in the course of offensive operations. However, the conditions for their occurrence, in contrast to such engagements in offensive operations, were different. As a rule, they arose in making a counterstrike against an enemy grouping which was driving into our defenses as well as when one of the opposing sides intentionally went over to the defensive for repelling powerful strikes which the enemy made with the forces of large tank groupings in the aim of relieving its surrounded troops or restoring the position on particularly important lines. An example of attacking an enemy grouping which was breaking into our defenses would be the counterstrike by the 5th Guards Tank Army against the Nazi tank grouping at Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943 in the battle at Kursk. The most typical example of the intentional going over of a tank grouping of a front to the defensive in the aim of repelling a massed enemy tank attack would be the operations of the 5th Guards and 6th Tank Armies on the external perimeter of encirclement of the Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy enemy grouping.

It must be pointed out that tank engagements were characterized by a number of *particular features* which distinguished them from conventional all-arms engagements.

One of the characteristic traits of the tank engagements from the period of the Great Patriotic War was their high dynamicness. Repeated regroupings of the forces from some sectors to others, broad maneuvers, adjustments and often a change in their combat missions due to the rapid, frequent and sometimes fundamental changes in the situation, were the most distinguishing features of these engagements.

Another important trait of the tank engagements must be considered their fierce nature. This was caused by the setting of decisive aims which were given to the opposing groupings. The fierceness of the tank engagements was directly dependent upon the number and condition of the involved resources of rifle, armored and mechanized troops, artillery and aviation. As is known, losses in armored equipment suffered by the sides are an indicator of the level of fierceness of such engagements. Suffice it to say that in the course of the tank meeting engagement at Prokhorovka, the overall losses of the sides for tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] during 24 hours were around 800 units.

Also among the characteristics of the examined engagements we would put the intensity of their conduct with the basic indicators for this being the duration and continuity of combat operations.

In contrast to the past, under present-day conditions, the nature of tank engagements will be influenced by fundamentally new factors brought about by the presence and possible use of nuclear and conventional weapons by the opposing sides, by the full mechanization of modern armies, including the mass equipping

of them with tanks and other armored equipment, by the increased arsenal of highly effective antitank weapons and by the antitank focus of the weapons of all the branches of troops and aviation. In this regard it is essential to bear in mind the concept of the "airland operation" worked out in the United States and adopted by the countries of the NATO bloc. Its essence in a generalized form consists in a deep pre-emptory fire damage to the enemy with the massed employment of electronics warfare equipment, the winning of fire superiority and air superiority and close cooperation of the ground troops and aviation. In realizing the designated concept the basic emphasis is placed by the enemy on employing not only nuclear weapons but also systems of highly accurate conventional weapons.

All of this makes it possible to conclude that tank engagements of the future will be characterized by even greater dynamicness, greater intensity and ferocity.

Essential particular features also existed in the organizing of tank engagements. The conditions of the occurrence of the engagement also had a great influence on the work methods of the commanders and staffs. Here, as experience shows, the amount of time available to prepare the troops for the engagement was the chief factor which determined the choice of one or another method.

An analysis of combat experience shows that the basic major tank engagements were prepared for, as a rule, in a short period of time. For example, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lt Gen Tank Trps P. A. Rotmistrov, had just about 4 hours to organize the engagement at Prokhorovka. In this situation the commander of the field force and his staff were only able to clarify the combat missions for the troops in accord with the changing situation, to give them the most essential instructions on cooperation and command and bring the first echelon formations up to the starting lines from which they later made the attack.

The commanders of the 5th and 6th Guards Tank Armies chose a completely different method for organizing the forthcoming engagement in the Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy Operation. Since these armies went over to the defensive ahead of time, their staffs had worked out documents to organize combat operations and these envisaged the carrying out of the basic measures indicating the time of their implementation. A characteristic feature of the work done by both army commanders was that immediately after receiving the mission to regroup from the interior to the exterior perimeter, they took the decision using the map, they issued instructions for the regrouping of the troops and then set out to the field with the commanders of the tank and mechanized corps and attached forces. Here the basic questions of organizing the defenses were settled and each formation and unit was shown its zone (sector) and the combat missions set. Here even before the finishing of the work, the troops, according to a preliminary schedule, began to move up into the defensive zones and areas indicated for them. In the course of preparing to repel the enemy strike, particular attention was given to antitank defenses. For this reason, they established a large number of antitank strongpoints and centers of resistance, strong tank second echelons and reserves as well as mobile obstacle building detachments and antitank artillery reserves.

It was most difficult to organize an engagement when the front's tank grouping was forced to fight against the enemy in the concluding stage of an offensive operation. Combat experience shows that in such instances the tank army commanders had extremely limited time not more than 24 hours.² For this reason, the plan for the forthcoming engagement and the forms and methods of conducting it were already determined in the course of the commenced combat operations. The troops were issued brief combat orders the essence of which usually consisted in the need to reach the operationally and tactically best lines by the designated time. In addition, the possible axes were set for the forthcoming enemy attacks and the time of them, missions were set for the artillery for fire damage to the enemy grouping, requests were given for air reconnaissance of the enemy for the purpose of attacking it and troop operations were also coordinated with the supporting aviation. This is approximately how the commander of the 1st Tank Army, Lt Gen Tank Trps M. Ye. Katukov and his staff organized their work in August 1943 in organizing the fight against the enemy tank divisions which had been moved up from the reserve to the area of Bogodukhov. An analogous method of organizing the tank engagement was chosen by the commander of the 3d Guards Tank Army, Lt Gen P. S. Rybalko, in the aim of defeating the enemy tank grouping to the south of Fastov in November 1943.

An analysis of the tank engagement in the last war indicates that *the methods of conducting them* varied. These depended upon many factors and primarily upon the conditions of the operational-tactical situation. Thus, the necessity of making a frontal attack arose, as experience showed, when the enemy tank grouping was rather strong, held an advantageous operational position and could create a real threat to enveloping the flanks of the Soviet armored and mechanized formations and units operating against it and attacking them in their rears. In this situation the use of a frontal strike led to a sharp reduction in the activeness of the enemy grouping. Moreover, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to maneuver its resources. Such a method was employed by the 5th Guards Tank Army at the engagement at Prokhorovka (see the diagram).

Without having broken through our defenses on the Oboyan axis along the Belgorod Highway, the enemy decided to reach Kursk via Prokhorovka and created a strong tank grouping on this sector. Under the developing conditions, the Soviet Command made a decision in the morning of 12 July 1943 to make a counter-strike from the area of Prokhorovka with a portion of the forces from the 5th Guards All-Arms Army and the entire strength of the 5th Guards Tank Army. At 0830 hours, the 5th Guards Tank Army, the first echelon of which included the XVIII, XXIX and II Guards Tank Corps,^{2a} after a heavy 15-minute intense artillery shelling and air strikes went over to the offensive. The first attacking echelon of formations at full speed broke into the enemy battle formations. The frontal attack against the enemy was so strong that its battle orders were broken and split. However, it put up fierce resistance. After the regrouping of forces at midday, it succeeded in threatening the right flank and the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. In this situation, in order to stop the advancing enemy, Gen P. A. Rotmistrov moved up a portion of the second echelon forces to the right flank of the field force and simultaneously regrouped a number of the first echelon units here. In the second half of the day, when it became clear that the enemy could not withstand the intensity of the engagement, in suffering heavy losses, the formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army began to gradually force it back to the initial position. By a powerful frontal attack

the enemy tank grouping was split up, it lost its attack strength and began to retreat.

In meeting engagements an attack was made against one of the enemy flanks with the simultaneous tying down of the enemy with a portion of the forces from the front. For example, in defeating the enemy tank grouping in the region of Kielce in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, the commander of the 4th Tank Army, Col Gen D. D. Lelyushenko, assigned a portion of the forces to contain the formations of the enemy XXIV Tank Corps from the front while the main forces attacked the left flank of this formation. As a result, the enemy grouping was forced to begin to retreat.

As combat experience was to show, a simultaneous attack on both enemy flanks was an effective means of troop operations in the tank engagements. In this regard instructive was the counterstrike of the Southwestern Front against the 1st Tank Group of the Nazi forces in June 1941. Involved in making it were a total of 6 mechanized corps and a portion of the forces from 3 rifle corps. As a result of active operations by both sides in the area of Lutsk, Radekhov, Brody and Rovno, a major tank meeting engagement developed involving around 4,000 tanks.³ In the course of the attacks by Soviet tanks, the offensive by the main assault grouping of the Nazi Army Group South was slowed down while the basic forces of the Nazi 6th Army was drawn into extended battles in the southern part of Polesye.⁴

In the Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy Operation, a tank engagement developed under the conditions of the going over of our troops to the defensive on the external perimeter of encirclement. As a result of the meeting attacks by the 5th Guards and 6th Tank Armies against Zvenigorodka in the Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy salient, a large Nazi troop grouping was surrounded. In the developing situation the Nazi Command began to rapidly bring up tank formations in order to break through the encirclement perimeter, relieve its surrounded troops and attempt to restore the defenses along the Dnepr River. In the aim of thwarting the enemy's plans, the Soviet Command shifted both tank armies from the internal perimeter to the external one, it strengthened each of them with a rifle corps and artillery and gave orders to go over to the defensive and not allow the enemy to break through to its surrounded troops.

In the morning of 4 February, the enemy attacked the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the aim of breaking through on the Shpola axis, but was unsuccessful. On the morning of the following day it again attacked the field force. However, the second attempt was also unsuccessful. Being persuaded of the futility of operations in this sector, the enemy command began to regroup its forces in the aim of attacking on the Lysyanka axis.

Simultaneously with the attack against the 5th Guards Tank Army, on 4 February, the enemy with the forces of the 16th and 17th Tank Divisions attacked the defenses of the 6th Tank Army from the line of Konstantinovka, Rossoshevka to the north. Fierce tank battles broke out. At a price of great losses, in 2 days, the enemy succeeded in advancing to a depth of 8-10 km and create a very difficult situation for the Soviet troops. Under these conditions the commander of the First Ukrainian Front regrouped the 2d Tank Army from around Vinnitsa. Under roadless conditions this field force made a forced march and in the

morning of 6 February without a halt attacked this enemy grouping which had broken through to the north of Tynovka. At the same time units of the 6th Tank Army attacked the enemy from the east. As a result of these actions the enemy advance was halted. However, regardless of the heavy losses, the Nazi Command did not abandon the idea of linking up with its surrounded troops. It carried out a number of regroupings on the external perimeter while the command of the surrounded troops was given the mission to prepare a meeting attack.

On 11 February the Nazis with the forces of 3 tank divisions and infantry units attacked the 6th Tank Army, they broke through its defenses on the line of Rybnyy Most, Rizino and by the end of the following day had reached the southwestern outskirts of Lysyanka. On the morning of 12 February, the surrounded troops also attacked and pressed the Soviet units to the southwest. As a result, the distance between the enemy troops fighting from the external perimeter and the surrounded units was not more than 10-12 km. The real threat arose of the linking up of these two Nazi groupings. For this reason, the Soviet Command in turn undertook a number of effective measures. For eliminating the enemy breakthrough and preventing the possibility of its linking up with the surrounded troops, it moved into this area the 2d Tank Army reinforced by the 3d Guards Airborne Division. The basic forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army were also moved here. In the region of Lysyanka, fierce tank battles broke out on a narrow sector of the front. During the period from 12 through 17 February, the engagement actually did not end during the night or day. By 17 February, the enemy tank grouping had suffered irrecoverable losses and had lost its strike force. The enemy was forced to break off the futile attacks and abandon its plan and by 20 February had withdrawn the remnants of its troops from the Lysyanka salient behind the Gornyy Tikich River.

This engagement, like the other major tank ones, involved not only the armored and mechanized troops but also rifle formations, artillery, engineer troops and aviation. The rifle divisions and corps held the lines to which the tank formations were moved and on the defensive along with the subunits of tanks and SAU firmly held their positions. The artillery played a major role. In being the basic fire force, it hit the enemy as it moved up and deployed, it combatted the tanks, it provided fire support to the flanks of its tank and mechanized formations and carried out many other tasks. Aviation played a special role in the tank engagements. Its main missions were to attack the enemy troops to the entire depth of their configuration, to conduct air reconnaissance as well as to seal off the area of the tank engagement from enemy aviation and prevent the bringing up of fresh enemy reserves. A significant amount of aviation was assigned to carry this out. Thus, the 1st Air Army as well as a portion of the forces of the 17th Air Army as well as the long-range aviation were used to help the 1st Tank Army in the engagement at Bogodukhov. Two air corps were assigned to help the 4th Tank Army in its meeting engagement in the area of Kielce (January 1945).⁵

In ensuring the success of the tank engagements a major role was played by troop air defense and this was one of the important factors for maintaining the viability of our tank groupings, as well as the logistical support of the troops, particularly the supplying of the units and formations with ammunition, fuel and lubricants.

All the above-stated makes it possible to conclude that the tank engagements in the course of the Great Patriotic War arose and were conducted at different stages as offensive and defensive operations. They rightly became one of the types of the all-arms engagements and were characterized by decisiveness and fierceness of combat operations, by the use of the broad maneuvering of resources, by a rapid change in the situation and great losses of armored equipment. These engagements had a significant impact on the course and outcome of the sides' military operations on the most important sectors.

Considering that presently the degree of motorization of the ground forces in the NATO armies and the proportional amount of tanks within them had significantly increased, it can be assumed that in the operations of a future war, if the aggressive imperialist circles start it, tank engagements can occur much more frequently than was the case in the previous war and they will pursue more decisive goals.

The changes occurring both in our tank troops as well as in the tank troops of the probable enemy in addition to the manifold increase in the combat effectiveness of the other branches of troops and aviation and the appearance of fundamentally new weapons systems will give the tank engagements new features.

At the same time, the experience of World War II has convincingly shown that the success of the tank engagements has always been achieved by the coordinated efforts of the field forces and formations of the various branches of ground forces and aviation. Without proper and continuous support from the artillery, aviation and air defenses, the tank groupings inevitably will suffer unjustified losses.

As a whole, the principles for organizing and conducting tank engagements as worked out on the basis of combat practices from the Great Patriotic War are also of significant value under present-day conditions. Their further development and skillful employment will help to increase the combat training level of our tank troops.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 6, 1978, p 579.
- ² A. I. Radziyevskiy, "Tankovyy udar" [Tank Attack], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1977, pp 187-188.
- ^{2a} The II Tank Corps at the outset of the engagement remained behind at the occupied line and secured the boundary area of the army's main attack grouping.
- ³ PRAVDA, 29 June 1941.
- ⁴ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1975, p 42.

⁵ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1973, p 27.

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
PREPARATIONS, CONDUCT OF 1944 BALTIC OPERATION DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 24 Aug 84) pp 22-28

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Col D. Muriyev: "Certain Characteristic Features of the Front and Army Operations Conducted in the 1944 Baltic Strategic Operation (On the 40th Anniversary of the Liberation of the Soviet Baltic)"]

[Text] The general military-political situation in the Baltic by the autumn of 1944 was basically determined by the victories achieved by the Soviet Army and as a result of this extensive Soviet territory had been liberated. The Nazi Command gave great importance to this area and endeavored to hold onto it with all its forces. Here it created a strong troop grouping, the Army Group North (the 16th and 18th Field Armies and the Operations Group Narva). The Army Group North from 21 September included the 3d Tank Army from the Army Group Center. This entire grouping numbered over 700,000 soldiers and officers, more than 1,200 tanks and assault guns, around 7,000 guns and mortars and up to 400 combat aircraft.¹ In anticipating an offensive by the Soviet forces, the enemy was feverishly improving the existing lines and creating new ones. Enemy defenses underwent particularly important development on the Riga sector where they had prepared the defensive lines Valga, Cesis, Sigulda and the Riga perimeters, two of which had each two previously prepared lines. Here the rivers, lakes, forests, swamps as well as the numerous farmsteads and farmhouses with stone structures were adapted for the defenses. All the positions were covered by mine-fields and wire obstacles.

The Soviet troops fighting in the Baltic were given the mission of routing the opposing enemy forces and continuing the liberation of the territory of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Soviet Republics.² For carrying out this the following fronts were involved: Leningrad (commander, MSU L. A. Jovorov), the Third Baltic (commander, Army Gen I. I. Maslennikov), the Second Baltic (commander, Army Gen A. I. Yeremenko) and the First Baltic (commander, Army Gen I. Kh. Bagramyan). The latter were to attack Riga along convergent axes. The Soviet troops during the first 5-8 days of the operation had to break through the enemy defenses in several areas and capture a line from 30-90 km from the initial position of the troops of the fronts and subsequently develop the offensive to a depth up to 300 km. The plans of the commanders of the fronts for the operation are shown in Diagram 1.



The Baltic Fleet (commander, Adm V. F. Tributs) was given the missions of landing amphibious forces, covering the flanks of the ground troops against enemy sea attack, providing fire support to the troops fighting on islands, carrying out troop movements and disrupting the enemy sea lines of communications. The 25th Separate River Boat Brigade which was operating on Lake Chudskoye was to assist the advance of the 8th and 2d Attack Armies and participate in an operation of landing one division on the northern lakeshore.³

The Baltic Strategic Offensive Operation was conducted in two stages. In the first of these (14-27 September), the Soviet troops liberated Estonia and reached the approaches to Riga and in the second (28 September-24 November) completed the liberation of the Soviet Baltic.

The most important military-political result of the operation was the completion of the liberation of the Soviet Baltic peoples (with the exception of Kurland) and the defeat of the Nazi Group North. Of the 59 formations comprising this strategic group, 29 were defeated while the remainder were pressed to the sea and isolated. The victory of the Soviet troops in the Baltic accelerated the withdrawal of Finland from the war. The length of the front line on the Baltic sector was reduced to 250 km. This made it possible to free significant forces for conducting the subsequent offensive operations on the central sector of the Soviet-German Front. The enemy was deprived of one of the most important food and raw material sources and the freedom of maneuvering the fleet in the Gulf of Riga and Gulf of Finland.

The offensive operations by the Soviet troops to liberate the Baltic provided rich experience in organizing and carrying out the breakthrough of the heavily fortified enemy defenses under the conditions of wooded-swampy and lake terrain in close cooperation with the forces of the branches of troops and Armed Services. Certain indicators of the front and army operations are given in Table 1.

As is seen from the table, the rates of advance in the front operations planned by Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command] were relatively low. They varied from 8 to 22.5 km per day and this was explained by the conditions of the wooded-swampy terrain and the presence of deeply echeloned enemy defenses.

One of the characteristic traits of the Baltic Operation was the *high degree of massing resources* on narrow breakthrough sectors. With a total length of the front of advance of 555 km, the enemy defenses were broken through in sectors comprising 76 km (13.7). Some 74 divisions out of the 95 (77.9) were used for the breakthrough.

The fronts had a single-echelon configuration. However, Hq SHC planned for the establishing of a second echelon for the Third Baltic Front by providing the 61st Army from the Headquarter Reserves.

Depending upon the specific situation, the armies had a single- and double-echelon configuration. A particular feature was in the presence in a majority of them of army mobile groups (with the exception of those where they planned to commit front-level mobile groups). The rifle corps and divisions, as a rule, established combat formations in two echelons. All of this increased the degree

Table 1*

Front and Army Field Forces	Width of Breakthrough Sector, km	Operational Configuration	Depth of Operation, km		Average Daily Rate of Advance, km/day
			Immediate Mission	Total Depth	
Leningrad	15	Sing.-echelon	100-110	270-300	10-12
2d Attack Army	15	Dbl.-echelon	18	110	10-12
Third Baltic	28	Dbl.-echelon	70-90	90	22.5
67th Army	10	Sing.-echelon	35	to 90	18-20
1st Attack Army	10	Sing.-echelon	to 35	to 90	18-20
54th Army	8	Sing.-echelon	12-15	70	18-19
Second Baltic	20	Sing.-echelon	25-30	140	to 8
10th Guards Army	6	Dbl.-echelon	18-20	140	to 8
3d Attack Army	5	Dbl.-echelon	18-20	140	to 8
22d Army	4	Sing.-echelon	18-20	140	to 8
First Baltic	13	Sing.-echelon	30	70	12-14
43d Army	9	Dbl.-echelon	30	70	12-14

* See: "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War], Vol 3, pp 517-521; "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" [History of Military Art], Vol 7, pp 408-409.


of massing the troops and provided superiority over the enemy in the sectors of the main thrusts.

The creation of decisive superiority in men and weapons over the enemy on the selected sectors of the main thrusts necessitated the carrying out of significant troop regroupings between and within the fronts. Thus, during the period of preparing for the operation the XIX and LXXXIV Rifle Corps were turned over to the First Baltic Front from the Third Belorussian Front, the 61st Army, the X Tank Corps and the 2d Guards Artillery Division were turned over from Headquarters Reserve to the Third Baltic Front and one (CXII) rifle corps from the Leningrad Front. Just the Leningrad Front regrouped the headquarters of the 2d Attack Army and 8 rifle divisions with reinforcements from the Narva sector to the Tartu area. Due to the impossibility of moving the troops by rail, the regrouping over a distance over 300 km was carried out over dirt roads.

The operations in the Baltic enriched the experience of selecting the sectors of the main thrusts of the fronts. By autumn of 1944, our troops here held an enveloping position in relation to the enemy. Under these conditions the most decisive results could be achieved by making the main thrust from the south to Riga. This was to be carried out by the First Baltic Front which had been reinforced by Hq SHC. The Leningrad Front was to make the main thrust from the area of Tartu to Rakvere.

The correct choice of the axis of the main thrust and the decisive massing of men and weapons made it possible to establish high operational and tactical densities, to achieve advantageous superiority over the enemy and to encircle the large strategic grouping on the maritime sector. Characteristic here was the fact that the isolating of the Baltic grouping and its encirclement were achieved by successfully breaking through the defenses and by carrying out an outflanking maneuver by the forces of the First Baltic Front on the Memel sector under conditions where the other flank of the enemy grouping had already been enveloped by the troops of the Third and Second Baltic Fronts.

The shifting of efforts from certain sectors to others was the most characteristic feature both in the entire strategic operations as well as in the front-level ones. Within the First Baltic Front alone four armies, two tank corps, one mechanized corps and a large number of reinforcements were rapidly regrouped from the Riga to the Memel sector over a distance from 80 to 240 km in the aim of cutting off the escape routes of the Baltic grouping into East Prussia (Diagram 2).



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The wooded-swampy terrain, the large number of rivers and lakes and the well prepared and deep enemy defenses caused significant difficulties in the advance of the troops and demanded dependable *engineer support of the operations*. The Soviet Command gave special attention to this question. With an overall density from 0.7 to 1.6 engineer and combat engineer company on the entire front, from 3.9 to 7.3 companies per kilometer were concentrated in the breakthrough sectors. Just the frontline units prior to the start of the operation cleared 3,398 population points of mines, as well as 14,726 km of roads and terrain on an area of 42,008 km². Some 31,055 antitank mines and 111 071 antipersonnel mines were removed and destroyed while 3,780 land mines and 2,944 "booby traps" were deactivated.⁴

Particular features of the engineer support for the operation were the careful preparations and skillful support for the crossing of rivers in the course of the attack on the forward edge and in the close tactical depth of the enemy defenses. On the First Baltic Front in order to artificially lower the water level in the Memel and Lielup Rivers from 1.5 to 20-50 cm and thereby provide for fording, wooden-earth dams were built. This freed a large amount of crossing equipment and achieved a high rate of crossing the rivers along a broad front. Both regulation and local crossing equipment were readied for the crossing of the men and weapons. For example, in the 43d Army for each first-echelon rifle regiment the combat engineers from available means built a 100-m assault bridge for the infantry and 20 rafts which could carry one squad each. In addition, parts were made for five prefab bridges each 70 m long.

In the front operations the partisans and underground provided substantial aid to the troops. Under the leadership of the party bodies in the Soviet Baltic republics, they provided the greatest possible aid to the advancing troops, they thwarted the mobilization violently carried out by the enemy command and conducted "track warfare" impeding the delivering of reserves and materiel to the front line.

Party political work also had its particular features. These were determined chiefly by the large number of recruits arriving in the troops from the induction of groups from the just liberated territory of the Baltic republics as well as the western oblasts of Belorussia and the Ukraine. A significant portion of the recruits did not have combat experience. In certain divisions the number of rank-and-file which previously had not participated in battles reached 70 percent and more. This required great efforts from the commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations to quickly bring the "novices" up to the level of experienced soldiers. Talks were conducted with the young soldiers on such subjects as: "The Military Oath--A Law in the Life of a Red Army Soldier," "The Current Moment and Our Tasks," "The Fraternal Aid of the Russian People to the Baltic" and others. On the eve of the offensive the Military Council of the Third Baltic Front in an appeal to the troops wrote: "Let us beat the Nazis in the Baltic and they will not appear in East Prussia. By this we will help the men of the other fronts...."⁵ The political bodies showed great concern for increasing the party ranks by recruiting experienced soldiers and commanders. By the start of the operation the First Baltic Front had 173,190 communists, the Second Front had 113,970 while the Leningrad Front had 173,433 party members and candidate members.⁶

It must be pointed out that for a number of reasons it was not possible to complete the defeat of the troops in the Army Group North in the course of the operation. A portion of its forces (more than 30 divisions) were able to retreat to the territory of Kurland, where they continued defensive operations up to the end of the war on the Soviet-German Front.

Among the important reasons for the incomplete attaining of the operation's goal we must put: the weakness of the initial attacks by the fronts and the insufficient degree of fire damage to the enemy in the course of the offensive. This was explained primarily by the low manning rate of the rifle divisions and by the small limit of ammunition assigned to the troops. As a result the breakthrough rate of the enemy tactical defense zone was low and this made it possible for the Nazi Command to consistently organize its defenses on previously prepared lines.

The reduced rate of advance was also explained by the fact that the rifle troops breaking through the prepared enemy defenses were not sufficiently reinforced by close support tanks. In the four fronts there were 3,080 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts [SAU]. However, approximately one-third of the total amount was assigned for close support as is seen from Table 2.

This applied particularly to the troops of the Second and Third Baltic Fronts, where 75 percent of the tanks and SAU were assigned to exploit the success and only around one-quarter (25 percent) for close support.

In going over to the offensive on the morning of 14 September, the troops of the fronts advanced slowly. Combat operations assumed a protracted nature. Only after the enemy suffered losses in the zone of the Leningrad and First Baltic Fronts and was forced to retreat were the troops of the Third and Second Baltic Fronts able to free extensive territory, cause great damage to the enemy personnel and combat equipment and reach the enemy's strong defensive line prepared 25-60 km around Riga.

Table 2*

Fronts	Armies	Number of Close Support Tanks	Density of Close Support Tanks (per km)
Leningrad	2d Attack	281	19
Third Baltic	67th	121	12.1
	1st Attack	83	8.3
	54th	33	4.1
	10th Guards	46	9
Second Baltic	3d Attack	24	5
	22d	36	9
	4th Attack	84	21
First Baltic	43d	169	18.8

* "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh...", Vol 3, p 522.

The heroism and valor of the Soviet troops and partisans in liberating the Soviet Baltic were highly regarded by the party and the government with 112 men receiving the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and 3 of them receiving a second Gold Star. Over 332,000 were awarded orders and medals. Some 131 units and formations received honorific designators such as Riga, Tallinn, Valga and others and 481 were commended with decorations of the motherland.⁷

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 6, 1978, p 514.
- ² See: "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 9, 1979, pp 136-137.
- ³ For the questions of the preparation and course of the Baltic Strategic Offensive Operation, see: "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 9, pp 134-153; "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 6, pp 514-516; "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voynе 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 3, 1958, pp 501-576; "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1962, pp 355-372; "Bor'ba za Sovetskuyu Pribaltiku v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynе 1941-1945" [The Struggle for the Soviet Baltic in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Riga, Liesma, 1966-1969, Books 1, 2, 3; "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" [The History of Military Art], Moscow, Izd. Voennoy akademii imeni M. V. Frunze, Vol 7, 1956, pp 400-453; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1974, pp 10-22.
- ⁴ See: "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh...", Vol 3, p 533.
- ⁵ "Bor'ba za Sovetskuyu Pribaltiku...", Book 2, p 142.
- ⁶ See: "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 9, p 138.
- ⁷ See: "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 5, p 516.

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ORGANIZATION, EXECUTION OF ASSAULT ON FORTIFIED AREAS TRACED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 24 Aug 84) pp 29-35

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col A. Pastukhov: "On Certain Particular Features of Preparing and Conducting Combat With the Breaking Through of Fortified Areas"]

[Text] In the course of offensive operations, the troops of the fronts and armies had repeatedly to break through the enemy fortified areas (FA). The most characteristic particular features in preparing for and conducting combat operations under these conditions were apparent in the Vyborg, Interburg-Konigsberg and Harbin-Kirin Operations.

The fortified areas differed from one another both in terms of design as well as position in the enemy's defensive system. However, common to all of them was a high concentration of strong and complex reinforced concrete and armored fortification works with special artillery and machine gun weapons. The number of defensive positions, their depth and density of fortification structures and the weapons located at them depended upon the importance of the sectors or installations being covered (see the table).

The defenses of a FA were organized, as a rule, according to a system of strongpoints and centers of resistance (Diagram 1) located in their majority on elevations, defiles between swamps and lakes covering the sectors accessible for the advance of troops. On the most threatened areas, ahead of the forward edge in a number of instances they set up forward defense area security zones which had antitank obstacles, concertina wires and hard-to-spot obstacles. The road sectors were reinforced by antitank and antipersonnel minefields. The intervals between centers of defense were equipped with field-type reinforcements. Such areas were usually defended by specially trained units independently or in cooperation with field troops. All of this inevitably caused a number of particular features in preparing and conducting combat operations to break through the FA.

First of all it must be pointed out that in breaking through the FA, the combat missions were given for a shallower depth than in an offensive against conventional defenses and at a slow pace. Thus, in the Harbin-Kirin Operation the combat missions for the rifle corps for the first day of the offensive were set




Diagram 1. Pogranichnaya Fortified Area. Northeastern Center of Resistance.

- Key:
- a--Machine gun permanent emplacement
 - b--Machine gun log emplacement
 - c--Antiaircraft position
 - d--Armored cupola
 - e--Machine gun nest
 - f--Single caponiers
 - g--Double caponier
 - h--Underground shelter
 - i--Utility structures
 - j--Underground dumps
 - k--Roads
 - l--Antitank trenches
 - m--Wire obstacle
 - n--Underground communications trench
 - o--Open communications trench
 - p--Escarpments
 - q--Observation post
 - r--Command post
 - s--Open artillery position
 - t--Heavy artillery position
 - u--Dummy positions
 - v--Artillery permanent emplacement

to a depth of 8-10 km. In the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus the advance for the formations of the 21st Army was planned at an average pace of 10-12 km a day.

The presence of numerous pillboxes in the FA necessitated their dependable fire damage. For destroying particularly strong works which could not be annihilated in the course of the artillery softening up, a special period of destruction was assigned in the system of the artillery offensive. Its duration varied and

depended chiefly on the nature of the fortifications, the conditions of observation and the number of involved weapons. For example, in the Vyborg Operation, the duration of this period was planned at 10 hours and in the Harbin-Kirin Operation 12 hours. In the preparations to storm Konigsberg, they planned to conduct a 1-day fire reconnaissance for detecting the targets and 3-day preliminary destruction of them involving high-powered and special-powered artillery. In the Vyborg Operation for this purpose just on the breakthrough sector of the 21st Army they planned to employ 240 guns of a caliber from 120 to 406 mm. In the 5th Army (Harbin-Kirin Operation), preliminary destruction of the targets was carried out by 106 guns of a caliber from 152 mm and over.¹

Table

Characteristics of Certain Enemy FA*

Name	Basic Indicators			
	Width, km	Depth, km	Number of Basic Pillboxes, units	Pillbox Density, units per km
Karelian**	76	to 5	1,250	16
Heilsberg	over 80	to 60	911	about 12
Mlawa	about 40	about 40	53	over 1
Letzen	to 100	35-40	250	2.5
Hutou	100	40	479	about 5
Pogranichnaya	40	30-35	495	about 13

* Compiled from: "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Vol 3, p 235; Vol 4, p 31; L. N. Vnotchenko, "Pobeda na Dal'nem Vostoke" [Victory in the Far East], 2d Revised and Supplemented Edition, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971, p 55; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1974, p 10.

** Here data are given for the enemy's second defensive line on the Karelian Isthmus.

The necessity of destroying and annihilating a large number of defensive structures² necessitated a longer-than-usual period of artillery softening up. Thus in the Harbin-Kirin Operation, this was planned to last 4 hours and 20 minutes and in the Vyborg Operation, 2 hours and 20 minutes.

The saturation of enemy defenses with pillboxes required a special approach to organizing the artillery support for the attack, that is, assigning for this purpose a significant amount of high and special-powered guns and carefully working out the questions combining fire and motion. For close support of the assault groups and detachments, up to a battalion was assigned usually from the regimental artillery groups [PAG]. Moreover, their actions were supported by fire of one or two PAG battalions. In individual instances they were assigned 152-mm and 203-mm guns and 160-mm mortars for destroying the strongest

targets.³ In the Insterburg-Konigsberg Operation, powerful army groups of long-range artillery (ADD) and corps artillery destruction groups were established. In the rifle regiments, divisions and corps of the 5th Army, the artillery groups included predominantly large-caliber guns and mortars; in the corps they organized destruction and long-range artillery groups.

For breaking through powerful positions prepared for extended defense, high massing of weapons was required. For example, in the Vyborg Operation, in the zone of advance of the 1st Army which made the main thrust, from 60 to 80 percent of all the front's resources were employed and a predominant portion of these, in turn, was concentrated on the 12.5-km breakthrough sector. This made it possible to achieve here artillery densities within the limits of 170-200 guns per kilometer.⁴ In the 5th Army which advanced directly against the Pogradichnaya FA, they had concentrated 3,077 guns and mortars and 432 rocket launchers. This established artillery densities per kilometer of breakthrough sector up to 260 guns and mortars.

The scope of an air offensive in the breakthrough was added to by a period of preliminary air softening up. In the Vyborg Operation in the course of it they planned to make ground attack bombing raids against the log emplacements and trenches, artillery batteries and reserves as well as against the rail junctions and rail heads.⁵ In the Harbin-Kirin Operation in the zone of the 5th Army the goal was set of detecting the enemy grouping, destroying the defensive works and neutralizing the personnel in the Pogradichnaya FA.

Great importance was given to the immediate air softening up which in the Harbin-Kirin Operation, for example, included a period of destruction (1 day) and preparations for the attack. During the destruction period they planned to make wave raids at the FA pillboxes and prior to the attack two massed raids against the surviving installations in this same area.

The deep echeloning of the defensive positions as well as the need to capture the surviving enemy pillboxes determined certain particular features in the operational configuration and battle formations of the troops. It was essential that the troop grouping established make not only a powerful initial attack but also constantly increase this in the course of carrying out the set missions (Diagram 2). For this reason the armies, formations and units had a deeper configuration than during an offensive under ordinary conditions. Thus, in the Insterburg-Konigsberg Operation, the armies, rifle corps and divisions of the Third Belorussian Front were formed up in two echelons.⁶ In the 5th Army of the Far Eastern Front in the Harbin-Kirin Operation, the second echelons of the army and its formations had all in all 2-fold more rifle battalions than in the first echelons. In the 21st Army of the Leningrad Front, the corps organized their battle formations in two echelons while the divisions did this in two or three. The effort in the sector of the main thrust, in addition, was to be increased by committing the front's reserve (two rifle corps and four separate rifle divisions) to the engagement.⁷ A permanent element in the battle formation was the assault detachments (battalions) and assault groups. These were temporary formations trained specially to seal off and destroy the individual permanent strongpoints and firing positions. The number and composition of the assault detachments depended upon the number and nature of the enemy strongpoints. Each of them included from a rifle company to a battalion

reinforced, respectively, by a platoon (company) of heavy tanks, several SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], minesweeping tanks, one or two platoons of combat engineers, a platoon of backpack flamethrowers and a subunit of chemical warfare troops to set up smokescreens. In a detachment (battalion) several assault groups were established according to the number of enemy pill-boxes. For example, in the Insterburg-Konigsberg Operation, the assault groups were organized in all the rifle battalions of the armies where there were pill-boxes in the zone of advance. The group consisting of two subgroups (seige and support) included from a squad to a platoon of infantry, the same number of combat engineers, several flamethrowers, two or three guns and the same number of mortars, two-four tanks and SAU. In addition, in each rifle division one reinforced rifle battalion was trained as an assault one.




Diagram 2. Combat Operations of 5th Army to Break Through the Pogradichnaya FA (August 1945)

The nature of actions in breaking through the FA also caused certain particular features in the employment of tanks and SAU. In the course of an offensive it was essential to maintain continuous and close cooperation between them and the infantry and artillery. In this regard, the basic mass of close support tanks was usually assigned to the rifle companies (assault groups), battalions (assault detachments) and regiments. In operating as part of them, by direct laying they quickly neutralized and destroyed the enemy firing points. In a number of instances the tanks and SAU with their own bodies blocked off the firing slits of the permanent emplacements and thereby facilitated their sealing off.

There were also certain particular features in the employment of the engineer troops. During the period of organizing the operation they were made responsible for preparing the devices for crossing all sorts of obstacles in the FA: mats, half-floating bays, ladders, fascines, bridge parts and so forth. In addition, the engineer subunits comprised an indispensable part of the assault detachments and groups, being the basic groups for destroying the defensive structures, as well as the front and army groups for capturing important enemy installations (tunnels, bridges and permanent emplacements). For example, of the six combat engineer battalions fighting in the area of the 5th Army, 163 clearing groups were organized (two each for every rifle company) and 106 assault groups (two each for every first echelon battalion). The lacking number of clearing groups were organized from riflemen trained for engineer work during the preparatory period.⁸

The main feature of logistic support was the establishing of significant supplies of ammunition (particularly large-caliber), engineer equipment (primarily explosives) and fuel and lubricants in the troops for the period of breaking through the FA. This was caused by the high consumption of materiel related to the destruction and elimination of numerous permanent emplacements, the crossing of various types of obstacles by the troops and often by the complexity of the terrain conditions. From the experience of certain operations just during the destruction period at least one unit of fire of ammunition was issued and the same amount for the destruction of the pillboxes in the course of the breakthrough.⁹ For example, some 96 shells of 203-mm caliber were expended to destroy the Millionaire permanent emplacement on the Karelian Isthmus.

In breaking through the FA, the command and staffs paid great attention to instructing the assault detachments and groups. For organizing the first, for example, in the 21st Army on the eve of the Vyborg Operation, 50 hours were assigned and 30 hours for the latter [assault groups]. The exercises were conducted on specially equipped terrain which reproduced the enemy defenses.¹⁰ The infantry was instructed in independently crossing all types of obstacles, rushing an installation from a distance of 100-150 m after intense shelling, sealing off and destroying the pillboxes. The tank subunits were instructed in firing at the firing slits and armored cupolas on the move and from brief halts as well as in cooperating with the artillery in accompanying the infantry. The artillery worked on firing at the firing slits and armored cupolas as well as supporting the infantry and tanks. The combat engineers trained in carrying out missions as part of the assault detachments and groups.

In the party political work, particular attention was given to establishing viable party and Komsomol organizations in the assault and reconnaissance subunits. Without fail, these included communists and Komsomol members who had combat experience. Special groups were established for passing on the experience of breaking through the FA. In particular, in preparing for the Vyborg Operation, in talks with the young soldiers the participants of breaking through the Mannerheim Line in the winter of 1940 shared their combat experience. Among the personnel of the First Far Eastern Front, officers from the 5th Army which had arrived from East Prussia gave lectures and briefings and conducted talks on special subjects.

In breaking through the FA, as a rule, there had to be planned, carefully prepared and organized "gnawing through" of the defenses by the assault actions of the infantry supported by artillery, aviation, tanks and engineer troops. In this regard, the order of advance was somewhat different. The first to go over to the attack were the assault detachments (battalions). Leapfrogging behind the infantry and tanks were the support guns, keeping a distance of not more than 200-400 m. The artillery of larger caliber (the 122-mm cannons and howitzers) assigned to combat the enemy heavy tanks and pillboxes also advanced leapfrog-fashion, echelon by echelon, in cooperating with the tanks and SAU and keeping within 500-600 m behind the attacking extended line. The heavy tanks and SAU assigned to the assault groups, in considering the terrain, advanced in the infantry battle formations, supporting them with accurate fire from brief halts against the fire slits, armored cupolas and field works adjacent to the permanent emplacements.¹¹

There were also instances when the breaking through of a FA was carried out without a halt. For example, the 44th Guards Tank Brigade (commander, Col I. I. Gusakovskiy) on 30 January 1945, without a halt, broke through the Mesertz FA, driving up to 60 km into the enemy defenses. During 2 days, the brigade, away from the main forces of the corps, held the captured area, preventing the enemy from moving its reserves up through it.¹²

The breaking through of a FA required a somewhat different organization of command than usual, characterized chiefly by its centralization. In the designated operations this was expressed primarily in the significant detailing of the missions to all levels of subordinates. The operational directives of the fronts, for example, gave not only the sectors of the main thrusts for the armies but also the place and size of the breakthrough areas, the number of troops required to carry out the missions, the operational configuration and position of command posts.¹³

Another indicator of the centralization of command was the bringing of the command and observation posts as close as possible to the troops. Thus, in the 28th Army of the Third Belorussian Front, prior to the start of the Insterberg-Konigsberg Operation, the observation posts of the army commander and the corps commanders were located 0.5-1 km from the first trench of their troops while the command posts of the rifle division and corps commanders were 2-3 km away.¹⁴

The nature of the terrain and enemy defenses in the Far East, in necessitating an advance along separate axes, forced the army commanders not only to bring their command posts up as close as possible to their troops but also to assign auxiliary command posts.

Considering the work being carried out abroad to reconstruct the existing FA and develop new ones, it can be assumed that their use in a system of defenses will not be excluded in the future. In this context a study of the experience of the Great Patriotic War in preparing and conducting operations to break through the FA is also pertinent for present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 241, inv. 2593, file 709, sheet 20; "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 3, 1958, p 242; Vol 4, 1959, p 658.
- ² By the start of the Vyborg Operation, for example, in the zone of the pending advance of the 21st Army they detected over 550 such targets and approximately 350 of them could be destroyed only by shells of 122-mm and larger caliber. I. P. Barbashin, et al., "Bitva za Leningrad. 1941-1944" [The Battle of Leningrad. 1941-1944], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1964, p 436.
- ³ "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Soviet Artillery in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1960, p 610.
- ⁴ I. P. Barbashin, et al., op. cit., p 436.
- ⁵ "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh...", Vol 3, p 244.
- ⁶ TsAMO, folio 241, inv. 2593, file 862, sheets 5, 6; file 664, sheet 31.
- ⁷ Ibid., folio 237, inv. 6675, file 79, sheets 11-13; file 383, sheet 17.
- ⁸ L. N. Vnotchenko, "Pobeda na Dal'nem Vostoke" [Victory in the Far East], p 351.
- ⁹ "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh...", Vol 3, p 243.
- ¹⁰ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1974, p 15.
- ¹¹ "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War], No 1, 1947, p 68; No 3, 1947, p 90.
- ¹² VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1974, p 121.
- ¹³ TsAMO, folio 241, inv. 2593, file 664, sheets 12-26; file 791, sheets 7-12.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., file 862, sheet 60.

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COOPERATION OF SOVIET, BULGARIAN FORCES AT END OF WORLD WAR II VIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 24 Aug 84) pp 36-45

[Article by Lt Gen Kh. Radonov: "Combat Unity and Cooperation of the Troops of the Bulgarian People's Army and the Soviet Army in World War II (September 1944-May 1945)"]

[Text] The combat unity of the Bulgarian People's Army [BNA] and the Soviet Army in World War II has a very noteworthy prehistory which began even in the course of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Under its influence, in 1923, the Bulgarian people initiated and organized antifascist revolt. Regardless of the heroism of its participants, it was cruelly suppressed by the monarchical-fascist dictatorship. In March 1941, the antipopular government succeeded in officially uniting Bulgaria with the fascist camp and Nazi troops entered the country.

The Bulgarian communist party [BCP], in having rich revolutionary and international traditions, initiated an active struggle against the reactionary regime in the country. When Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the BCP assumed a policy of initiating an armed struggle against the Nazi occupiers and their Bulgarian agents. The Soviet Union provided invaluable aid in this struggle. Regardless of the enormous difficulties, even in August-September 1941, seven specially trained groups of party workers were moved into Bulgaria from the USSR in the aim of activating the party underground and partisan operations.

The Fatherland Front Program worked out in 1942 under the initiative of the BCP and under the leadership of Georgi Dimitrov became a sound basis for unifying the revolutionary-liberation and democratic forces of the people.

In the nation such a broad-armed, political and ideological struggle developed and this was so ardently supported by the basic masses of all strata of the population that the authorities decided against sending a single soldier to the Eastern Front against the USSR. Under the influence of the victories of the Soviet Army, thousands of fighters from the People's-Liberation Rebel Army fought with weapons in hand against fascism. When the Soviet troops crossed the Bulgarian frontier, the masses of people during the night of 9 September 1944, under the BCP leadership, rose to an armed revolt and attacked the fascists. The partisan detachments as well as units of Bulgarian troops which had come over to the side of the people subsequently formed the backbone of the BNA.

A people's democratic power of the Fatherland Front was established in the country and this legitimized the relations of friendship and collaboration with the Soviet Union.

Thus, the armed antifascist struggle of the Bulgarian people during the 1941-1944 period was waged on the side of the anti-Nazi coalition in unity with the Soviet people. In fighting the enemy, the Bulgarian partisans and antifascists realized that they were aiding the men of the Soviet Army and as much as possible were making their own humble contribution to the defeat of fascism. On this moral and political basis, the combat unity and collaboration of the troops of the Soviet and Bulgarian armies were established and developed in the concluding stage of World War II.

The Fatherland Front government which came to power broke all ties with Nazi Germany and declared war against it. Participation in the armed struggle on the side of the anti-Nazi coalition was of important political significance for Bulgaria. An end was put to the international isolation of the country, it won the right to fight for a worthy and just peace, it defended the victories of its revolution and made a definite contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany. "We should firmly remember," wrote Georgi Dimitrov on 28 September 1944, "that the future of our country will depend primarily upon the real contribution which we, as a people and state, will now make to the overall war effort aimed at rapidly defeating Nazi Germany, at a quick, victorious conclusion of the war and at establishing a new, sound and just peace."¹

The question of the involvement of the BNA in the war against Nazi Germany was settled on 10 September 1944 at meetings of representatives of the BRP(k)² Central Committee and the Fatherland Front government with the command of the Third Ukrainian Front. At these meetings a number of questions was settled concerning the joint actions of the Bulgarian and Soviet armies to expel the Nazis from the Balkans.³

The Fatherland Front government turned to the Soviet government with a request that the Soviet Command send a representative to Sofia for coordinating the actions of the Bulgarian troops with the troops of the Third Ukrainian Front. The Bulgarian troops in operational terms were under the commander of the Third Ukrainian Front. Here the High Command and Staff of the Troops (General Staff) were kept in the BNA. The command of the Third Ukrainian Front through them set the missions for the Bulgarian troops and organized cooperation with them.⁴ Leadership over the Soviet troops on Bulgarian territory and the coordinating of their actions with the BNA, upon instructions of Hq SHC of 13 September, were entrusted to the chief of staff of the Third Ukrainian Front, Col Gen S. S. Biryuzov.⁵ The Soviet Command showed great attention to the young Bulgarian Army. "In respecting the national feelings of our Bulgarian friends," commented S. S. Biryuzov, "we have instituted an order where we in no manner have replaced their own command. We merely helped it organize the operations of the Bulgarian troops according to the common missions of the front. No written orders were issued by us. These were replaced by personal contact with the leaders of the Bulgarian Army.... We jointly reviewed all the vital questions. We always had fullest mutual understanding. The friendship between the Soviet and Bulgarian troops immediately put down even deeper roots."⁶

Upon the request of the Bulgarian Command, Soviet military advisors and instructors were sent to the staffs of the Bulgarian armies and formations. As a result, favorable conditions were established for closer cooperation and the use of the very rich combat experience of the Soviet Army by the personnel.

The entry of the BNA into the war against Nazi Germany was carried out in an exceptionally difficult situation. The problem was that the new Bulgarian army had not been fully mobilized. At the end of August 1944, the Nazi Command had concentrated significant forces on the western frontier of Bulgaria. Also not to be excluded was an overt action by the reactionary forces within the country which had still not been completely defeated and this could have been utilized by the Nazi Command. In Eastern Thrace, there was a large grouping of Turkish troops. Under appropriate conditions it also could invade Bulgarian territory. Consequently, the mobilizational and operational deployment of the Bulgarian Army required a secure covering of the state frontiers.

At the beginning of September 1944, the Nazi troops began to disarm certain Bulgarian units in Macedonia and on 10 September German aviation attacked fuel dumps in the area of Verinsko. At the same time, Nazi troops began invading Bulgarian territory in individual sectors.

In accord with the agreement reached at Chorna Voda between the Command of the Third Ukrainian Front and the Bulgarian Party-Governmental Delegation headed by the member of the Politburo of the BRP(k) Central Committee, Dimitri Ganev, measures were taken to wipe out the enemy troops. For this purpose units of the BNA were employed as well as the Georgi Benkovski, Khristo Mikhaylov and Nikola Kalapchiev partisan detachments. After 9 September 1944 these partisan units had gained hundreds of volunteers. Their actions deprived the enemy of initiative and created favorable conditions for carrying out the future offensive operations.

For ensuring the security of the western regions of Bulgaria and its capital of Sofia, upon instructions of Hq SHC, on 20 September the Command of the Third Ukrainian Front established the Separate Sofia Operational Troop Group. The southern and southeastern frontiers of the nation were to be defended by the II Corps, the 3d and 8th Infantry Divisions of the BNA as well as by the 37th Army and the IV Guards Mechanized Corps of the Soviet troops concentrated in the area of Elkhovo, Karnobat, Kazanluk, Novo-Zagora and Yambol.⁷ In the aim of precise coordination of the air defense forces in carrying out the set missions, a joint command post for air defense was organized by an order of the front's commander.

The command and the staffs of the Third Ukrainian Front provided great aid to the BNA command and staffs in planning and preparing the offensive operations, in organizing cooperation and in determining the methods of combat.

All questions of the cooperation of the Bulgarian Army with the troops of the Third Ukrainian Front were reflected in the planning documents and in the course of combat they were adjusted by Col Gen S. S. Biryuzov and the advisors on the staffs of the Bulgarian troop divisions.

The first operation involving Bulgarian troops was the Belgrad Offensive Operation of the Third Ukrainian Front which commenced on 28 September 1944. The successful development of the offensive was also aided by the active operations of the Bulgarian troops which in the battles to liberate the eastern regions of Yugoslavia in cooperation with the Soviet and Yugoslav troops, carried out four successive operations: Nis, Stracin-Kumanovo, Bregalnica-Strumnica and Kosovo. In the first stage, the Bulgarian troops, together with the Soviet Army and troops from the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, routed the 7th Mountain Division SS Prinz Eugen, the 11th Airfield Division, the 22d Airborne Division and other composite enemy units. Subsequently, in the advance on Kosovo, the BNA troops fought four other enemy formations, depriving them of an opportunity to concentrate in the area of Belgrad and to operate jointly against the main assault groupings of the Third Ukrainian Front.⁸

Thus, operational cooperation between the formations of the Soviet troops and the Bulgarian Army basically was expressed in providing mutual aid in the aim of quickly capturing objects deep in the enemy defenses as well as in thwarting the maneuvering of its reserves and preventing their use against our main troop groupings. An instructive example of close cooperation was the support for the BNA offensive by the aviation of the 17th Air Army. In order to utilize most effectively the aviation of the Third Ukrainian Front in the interests of the operations of the Bulgarian troops, an operations group of the air army was sent with command equipment to the staff of the 2d Bulgarian Army which was to make the main thrust on the Nis sector, while officers were sent to the staffs of the 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions for target designation and guidance.⁹

On the staff of the 2d Army, with the participation of the operations group from the 17th Air Army, a plan was worked out for cooperation with a detailed allocation of the assigned flight resources in terms of missions, stages and days of the operation. It also reflected the questions of calling in the aviation, recognition signals and measures to support air combat.

Regardless of the bad meteorological conditions, Soviet aviation covered the troops of the 2d Army from the air, it conducted tactical and operational reconnaissance, it attacked enemy personnel and weapons and struck its lines of communications and reserves. Just during the first day of the offensive, eight regimental sorties of fighter and ground attack aviation were made to support the army. An example of the precise coordination was the joint operations of the 2d Bulgarian Army with the Soviet aviation in defeating the 7th Mountain Division SS Prinz Eugen on the Nis sector. "The air forces of Maj Gen Belitskiy and Col Smirnov (commanders of the air divisions of the 17th Air Army--Editors)," reported the commander of the 2d Bulgarian Army, "by outstanding operations greatly helped the successful and brilliant conclusion of the Nis Operation."¹⁰ In the air support for the 1st Army, particularly in capturing the Stracin positions on Yugoslav territory, the Bulgarian pilots, who knew the terrain well, helped their Soviet friends in carrying out the combat missions.¹¹

The tactical cooperation between the subunits, units and formations of the Bulgarian and Soviet troops was also expressed in the maintaining of continuous contact, in providing aid in the taking of important installations deep in the defenses and on the boundary areas of the advancing troops, and in exchanging information. For example, in the course of the battles for the town of Nis, the

reconnaissance company of Capt N. M. Kupul'skiy gained valuable information on the enemy and this was immediately transmitted to the staffs of the cooperating Soviet, Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops.

The Soviet military advisors helped the Bulgarian officers master the principles of combat both on the offensive and on the defensive. The Bulgarian troops, in turn, in carrying out their patriotic and international duty, fought boldly and decisively. Even during the first days of the offensive, the platoon commander Georgi Khristov and Pfc Nikola Nikolaev repeated the legendary feat of Pvt Aleksandr Matrosov¹² using their bodies to block the firing slits of enemy pillboxes the fire of which impeded the advance of their subunits.

MSU S. S. Biryuzov had high praise for the actions of the Bulgarian troops. "The Bulgarians fought," he wrote, "magnificently. Several times I observed how the soldiers, officers and generals of the BNA behaved in crucial moments and I never observed panic or confusion. Only unstoppable drive forward. And in essence, the Bulgarian troops were undergoing their first baptism in fire."¹³

After the Belgrad Operation, the troops of the Third Ukrainian Front began a regrouping to participate in the Budapest Operation while the Bulgarian troops which had participated in liberating the eastern regions of Yugoslavia began to return home. But this did not mean that Bulgaria had pulled out of the war on the side of the anti-Nazi coalition. The party, the government and all the Bulgarian people were fully determined to carry out their international duty, fighting until the complete defeat of Nazi Germany. However, initially certain questions had to be settled related to the organization and leadership of the combat of the BNA and its cooperation with the Soviet Army.

On 18 and 19 November 1944 in Sofia, the commander of the Third Ukrainian Front MSU F. I. Tolbukhin held talks with representatives of the BRP(k) Central Committee, the government and the commander-in-chief of the BNA. As a result, agreement was reached that Bulgaria would continue participating in the Patriotic War, having fielded one field force consisting of five or six formations each with 12,000 men as well as army units and support units.¹⁴ In accord with this, the Fatherland Front government on 28 November 1944 took a decision to establish the Separate 1st Bulgarian Army and for it to participate in the subsequent combat under the leadership of the commander of the Third Ukrainian Front.

As is known, in mid-December 1944, the basic efforts of the Third Ukrainian Front were aimed at liberating Budapest. For this reason, the 1st Bulgarian Army at the beginning of January 1945, upon the orders of the front's commander was redirected to Hungarian territory, it replaced there the Yugoslav troops in the area of Barcs, Torjanc, to the north of the Drava River, and in the sector Nagyatad, Koni, Beremend, units of the LXXV Rifle Corps and went over to a rigid defensive in the aim of preventing an enemy breakthrough.¹⁵ In turning over the positions, the commanders of the corps formations and units showed great attention to the Bulgarian soldiers. They familiarized the Bulgarian friends with data on the enemy defenses, they turned over ready-to-go all their defensive structures with all prepared materials and elements and carried out a number of other measures for the successful conduct of combat.

The cooperation between the troops and the 1st Bulgarian Army during the course of the operation were organized by the front's commander. The army worked out a special cooperation plan with the 17th Air Army as well as instructions to support the boundary areas with adjacent units. Mutual information between the staffs of the front and the army was provided via the operations groups.

In reaching Hungarian territory, the 1st Bulgarian Army had grown distant from its basic supply depots and supply had become significantly harder. The Military Council of the Third Ukrainian Front on 13 April 1945 adopted a decision to supply the 1st Bulgarian Army with food and fuels and lubricants using the rations of the Soviet Army.¹⁶

In the course of the joint combat during the period of conducting the Budapest Operation, there was a regular exchange of information on the enemy between the commanders of the Bulgarian and Soviet troops; a unified document-handling system was instituted. Ties between the Soviet and Bulgarian commanders became closer.

A study by the Bulgarian military of the combat experience of the Soviet troops and its introduction into practice produced positive results. The stubborn and active defensive of the Bulgarian troops checked the enemy advance and thereby supported the left flank of the front's main forces fighting on the Budapest sector.

Cooperation was also successfully carried out between the political bodies of the Soviet Armed Forces and the political personnel of the BNA. Thus, the most experienced political workers from the Third Ukrainian Front were actively involved in giving lectures and exchanging work experience in the courses for political personnel organized under the Bulgarian Army's Staff and later under the corps staffs.

During the period of the Balaton Defensive Operation, the 1st Bulgarian Army cooperated with the 57th Army of the Third Ukrainian Front and the Yugoslav People's Liberation Army.

The plan for the front's defensive operation envisaged several possible actions of the Bulgarian troops. At the basis of the overall plan for conducting the operation was the idea of hitting the enemy in the tactical defensive zone and establishing conditions for carrying out a counterstrike and going over to the offensive by the troops. In the sector of expected enemy attack of Nagykanizsa and Kaposvar, the defenses were held by the 57th Army and the III Corps of the 1st Bulgarian Army. They had the mission of strongly defending the line of Lake Balaton, Babocsa and then along the left shore of the Drava to Torjanc. Further to the left the defenses were held by the IV Corps of the 1st Bulgarian Army.

The combat operations of the 57th Army and the 1st Bulgarian Army were supported by the 244th Bomber Division, the 10th Guards Ground Attack Division and the 236th Fighter Division of the 17th Air Army as well as by a portion of the forces of the Danube Naval Flotilla. Cooperation between the 1st Bulgarian Army and the 17th Air Army was organized by missions and lines. Attacks were planned by call-in.

Of important significance for maintaining [cooperation] were the personal contacts between the front and the army. The cooperation between the men of the two fraternal armies was particularly apparent in the joint combat on the boundary areas of the units and formations of the Soviet and Bulgarian troops. All attempts by the enemy to break through the defenses of the 57th Army were unsuccessful. Introduced piecemeal into the area was the 12th Bulgarian Infantry Division which was temporarily put under the commander of the LXIV Rifle Corps of the Soviet troops.¹⁷ "The Bulgarian Division," the commander of the 57th Army, Gen M. N. Sharokhin, "honorably carried out all the missions assigned to it. The 31st Regiment of this division was in one of the most crucial areas, on the boundary of the Soviet and Bulgarian troops.... By its steadfastness, it provided great aid to the units of the 299th Soviet Division fighting next to it."¹⁸

Cooperation was also carried out well in repelling the enemy offensive on the Donji Miholjac, Mohacs sector. By an active and stubborn offensive, the troops of the IV Bulgarian Corps supported the concentration and commitment to battle of the CXXXIII Rifle Corps of the Soviet troops and the 16th Infantry Division of the BNA.

By an order of the front's commander, a temporary operations group headed by Gen A. V. Blagodatov was organized to coordinate combat of the IV Corps and 16th Infantry Division of the BNA and the CXXXIII Rifle Corps of the Soviet Army. All these measures created favorable conditions for successful combat. As a result, on 19 March, the enemy bridgehead on the Drava in the Donji-Miholjac area has been eliminated by the joint efforts of the Soviet and Bulgarian troops. The Soviet and Bulgarian soldiers in these battles showed bravery, valor and mutual support. For this reason, the commander of the Third Ukrainian Front in a telegram addressed to the commander of the 1st Bulgarian Army, Gen V. Stoychev, commended the Bulgarian soldiers for the steadfastness shown on the defensive.

Subsequently, in the course of the Vienna Offensive Operation the preparations for which were carried out under the conditions of heavy defensive engagements, cooperation between the troops of the two fraternal armies became closer. Within the Vienna Operation, the 1st Bulgarian Army conducted the Mur Offensive Operation. In utilizing the rich combat experience of the Soviet Army, the Bulgarian commanders and military chiefs which participated in this operation gained great practice in preparing for and conducting an army-level offensive operation, in the decisive concentration of resources on the selected sector, in organizing pursuit as well as in carrying out many other tasks.

Interesting and instructive was the experience of cooperation between the Soviet and Bulgarian sailors. On 8 September 1944, Bulgarian sailors had joyfully greeted their Soviet brothers and provided them with help in crossing and deactivating the minefields along the Black Sea Coast and up the Danube River. On that same day, Bulgarian ships participated in the ferrying of Soviet troops across the river. On the morning of 9 September, the minesweeper "Vasil Levski" escorted the first ships with the personnel and combat equipment of the formations from the first echelon of the Third Ukrainian Front up the Danube. In following days, the Bulgarian sailors participated in the sweeping of mines in the river channel and in escorting Soviet ships from Ruse to Vidin.

Of particular importance was the incorporating of the Bulgarian river ships as part of the Soviet Danube Naval Flotilla under the command of Rear Adm S. G. Gorshkov. This made it possible by joint efforts to promptly repair and return to service damaged Bulgarian and captured Nazi vessels. Soviet mining specialists were assigned to the crews of certain Bulgarian ships and Bulgarian sailors worked on the captured rebuilt vessels as they had a good knowledge of the operating principles of the German magnetic acoustic instruments.¹⁹

In the process of clearing the Danube of mines, in ferrying troops and in the course of supply shipments, the Bulgarian and Soviet sailors cooperated closely. Due to the friendly and unstinting actions of the Soviet, Bulgarian and Romanian sailors, the Danube was turned from a "road of death" into a "road of life." For the skill shown in independent and joint combat operations, the Bulgarian minesweeper "Khristo Botev" was given the title of "Guards Minesweeper" and participated in the triumphal parade of the Soviet Danube Military Red Banner Flotilla near Vienna.

The cooperation of the 1st Bulgarian Army with the Soviet Danube Flotilla, was expressed chiefly in joint fire damage to the enemy, in troop and supply shipments as well as in logistical support for the Bulgarian troops.

In a short period of time (from 19 through 24 September 1944), with unprecedented enthusiasm, Bulgaria mobilized almost a half million men for the army but it was not supplied with the necessary weapons, combat equipment and materiel. In responding to a request from the Bulgarian government, on 14 March 1945, the GKO [State Defense Committee] adopted a decree on turning over to the BNA 344 aircraft, 65 T-34 tanks, 935 guns and mortars, 28,500 rifles and automatics, 1,170 light and medium machine guns, 280 antitank rifles, 369 radios, 2,572 telephone sets and 370 motor vehicles.²⁰ A significant portion of the designated weapons and combat equipment was transferred to the BNA in the course of the war and the remainder by the end of 1945.

The combat feats of the Soviet and Bulgarian soldiers in the struggle against the common enemy were given proper recognition by the peoples and governments of the two fraternal countries. The people's government of Bulgaria awarded 750 Soviet soldiers and officers the Order for Bravery while over 50,000 soldiers received the Medal of the Patriotic War of 1944-1945. In turn, for courage and heroism shown in battles, 360 Bulgarian servicemen received Soviet orders and 120,000 the medal "For Victory Over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."²¹ The successful combat operations of the Bulgarian troops were thrice commended in orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (30, 31 March and 2 April 1945).

The joint combat of the Bulgarian and Soviet troops against the common enemy during the Patriotic War of Bulgaria (1944-1945) marked a beginning to the combat collaboration of the two fraternal armies which was developed and strengthened during the postwar years both on a bilateral basis as well as within the Warsaw Pact.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 G. Dimitrov, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Sofia, Vol II (1939-1949), 1968, p 65.
- 2 Prior to 1948, the Bulgarian Communist Party was called the Bulgarian Workers Party (Communist) or BRP(k).
- 3 TsVA NRB [Central Military Archives of the People's Republic of Bulgaria], folio 136, inv. 1, stor. unit 1, sheet 5; VOENNOISTORICHESKI SBORNIK, No 3, 1980, p 7.
- 4 "Istoriya na Otechestvenata vojna na Bulgariya 1944-1945" [History of the Patriotic War of Bulgaria of 1944-1945] [in Bulgarian], Sofia, Vol 2, 1982, p 26.
- 5 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 9, 1978, p 127.
- 6 S. S. Biryuzov, "Sovetskiy soldat na Balkanakh" [The Soviet Soldier in the Balkans], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1963, p 201.
- 7 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 9, p 127; M. Minasyan, "Osvobozhdeniye narodov Yugo-Vostochnoy Yevropy" [The Liberation of the Peoples of Southeast Europe], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, pp 231-232.
- 8 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 9, pp 176-179; "Istoriya na Otechestvenata vojna...", Vol 2, pp 118, 160.
- 9 "Istoriya na Otechestvenata vojna...", Vol 2, p 130.
- 10 Ibid., Vol 2, p 155; VOENNOISTORICHESKI SBORNIK, No 4, 1979, pp 4-5; "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 9, p 178.
- 11 See: VOENNOISTORICHESKI SBORNIK, No 3, 1980, p 9.
- 12 See: "Vekovaya druzhba, boyevoye bratstvo. Vekovna druzhba, boyno bratstvo" [Eternal Friendship, Military Fraternity (in Russian and Bulgarian)], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1980, pp 211-214; VOENNOISTORICHESKI SBORNIK, No 4, 1979, p 5.
- 13 S. S. Biryuzov, op. cit., pp 222-223.
- 14 "Istoriya na Otechestvenata vojna...", Vol 2, pp 338-339.
- 15 "Sbornik Otechestvenata vojna na Bulgariya 1944-1945" [Collection of the Patriotic War of Bulgaria of 1944-1945], Documents and Materials, Vol 3, 1980, pp 122-124.
- 16 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 10, 1979, p 182.
- 17 TsVA, folio 49, inv. 2, stor. unit 19, sheet 173.

- 18 M. N. Sharokhin and V. S. Petrukhin, "Put' k Balatonu" [The Path to Balaton], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1966, p 123.
- 19 TsVA, folio 1082, inv. 2, stor. unit 12, sheet 342.
- 20 "Istoriya vtoroy mirivoy....," Vol 10, p 189.
- 21 "Sovetskaya Voenaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 1, 1976, p 550; "Vekovaya družba, boyevoye bratstvo....," p 239.

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BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON MONGOLIAN HEROES OF KHALKHIN-GOL BATTLES GIVEN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 24 Aug 84) pp 46-49

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof I. Kuznetsov: "Heroes of the Mongolian People's Republic Who Participated in the Battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River"]

[Text] Some 45 years have passed since in August 1939 the Soviet-Mongolian troops routed the crack formations of the 6th Japanese Army which had invaded Mongolian territory in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River. Important factors in the victory over the Japanese invaders were: the combat unity of the two fraternal armies, unprecedented heroism and mutual support of the Soviet and Mongolian troops. On the battlefields at Khalkhin-Gol, the fraternal friendship of our peoples united by a common goal and the same interests was strengthened by the sacred blood of the Soviet and Mongolian troops.

Proof of the mass heroism of the Soviet and Mongolian troops during the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol was the fact that more than 17,000 soldiers, commanders and political workers of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] were given governmental awards for feats and bravery with 70 of them becoming Heroes of the Soviet Union. The pilots S. I. Gritsevets, G. P. Kravchenko and Ya. V. Smushkevich received a second Gold Star. Mongolian orders and medals were presented to 878 soldiers and commanders from the two fraternal armies including more than 400 men of the MNA [Mongolian People's Army].

Twelve of the most courageous sons of the Mongolian people were awarded the highest decoration of Mongolia, the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic, for feats carried out on Khalkhin-Gol. The journal has already published information on nine of them.¹ Below we offer a selection of three other Heroes of the Mongolian People's Republic: N. Zhamba, S. Tumurbator and M. Ekey.³

Norpiliyn Zhamba, a master sergeant and commander of a border patrol squad. He was born in 1918 in Bogd Somon in Bayankhongorskiy Aymak [District] in a herder family. Member of the MNRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] from 1953. He joined the MNA in 1937 and served in the 23d Regiment of the 8th Cavalry Division and later in the Khalkhin-Gol Border Troop Detachment. In 1938, he completed commander school of the Unified Military School in Ulan-Bator and was

appointed commander of a squad in the 7th Border Patrol. In the postwar years before retiring on pension he continued to serve in the Border Troops and in the MNR units. At present, he is employed in the national economy.

N. Zhamba from the very first days of the Khalkhin-Gol battles worthily carried out all combat assignments. Many times he was on patrol and repeatedly went out on reconnaissance to capture prisoners. Along with other border troops he engaged the numerically superior enemy forces more than 30 times and achieved success. Thus, in February 1939, N. Zhamba with ten border troops was standing patrol duty at Ulgur Mankhan. At that time around 400 enemy cavalry troops violated the state frontier. The squad of N. Zhamba along with the border troops of the adjacent outpost successfully repelled the attack by the numerous enemy. In May as part of the subunits of the 7th Border Patrol he excelled in battle against large enemy subunits (the total number was over 500 men) who violated the frontier in the areas of Khaylastyn-Gol and Nomun Khan Burd Obo.

On 25 July, N. Zhamba along with the chief of the patrol P. Chodgon and other border troops participated in destroying a Japanese communications center in the Darkhan-Ulga Mountains and showed boldness and resourcefulness in capturing a prisoner for interrogation.

During the July battles of the Soviet-Mongolian troops against the Japanese invaders, N. Zhamba carried a stricken comrade from the battlefield under enemy fire. At the same time with two other border troops he captured two Japanese and an enemy vehicle with food.⁴

For outstanding successes in defending the motherland against the Japanese aggressors and for heroism and courage shown in this, by the Ukase of the Presidium of the Great People's Hural [Assembly] of 18 August 1979, the former border troop Norpiliyn Zhamba was awarded the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Samdangiyn Tumurbator, now lieutenant colonel of the Border Troops. He was born in 1914 in Ulzit Somon in Arkhangeyskiy Aymak in a herder family. He has been a member of the MNRP since 1937.

In 1935, he was called up for military service and sent to a Separate Border Regiment. From 1936 he was a squad commander in the Erdenetsagan Border Detachment. From January 1937, he was the chief of the 4th Border Patrol and later the 6th. In 1953-1969, he worked in the national economy and from 1969 he was again serving in the Border Troops.

S. Tumurbator participated in the battles against the Japanese invaders on the Khalkhin-Gol. More than 20 times he boldly led the men of his patrol into attack against the superior Japanese forces which had invaded Mongolian territory.

On 3 July 1939, having received data on the crossing of the state frontier being readied by the subunits of Japanese infantry and cavalry reinforced with tanks, S. Tumurbator at the head of a border troop subunit headed to the area of Atsgurvan Shire where he detected enemy intruders. In the exchange of fire, seven frontier violators were destroyed and one taken prisoner.

On 28 and 30 August, the enemy numbering up to 30 men violated the frontier in the area of Mount Ers Ula. The Mongolian Border Troops under the command of Tumurbator wiped out virtually the entire intruder group and three Japanese officers were taken prisoner.

On 7 September in the same area, superior enemy forces made a surprise attack on a Soviet Army subunit. The patrol of S. Turmurbator came to the aid of the Soviet troops. By 1800 hours on 8 September, the invading enemy had been crushed by the efforts of Turmurbator's border troops and the neighboring patrol, the personnel from a battalion of Soviet infantry and a squadron of the MNA 5th Cavalry Division.

The border troops of the 6th Patrol headed by S. Turmurbator in battles against the Japanese in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939 destroyed all in all 300 enemy soldiers and officers and captured significant equipment.⁵ For the exemplary fulfillment of combat assignments and for heroism shown in battle against the Japanese invaders, the personnel of the patrol received the Orders of the Combat Red Banner, the Polar Star and the Honorific Badge of a Chekist [member of the Secret Police]. Subsequently for combat services and heroism in repelling Japanese aggression the men and commanders of the patrol received the highest governmental award, the Order of the Combat Red Banner.

For skillful troop leadership in the battles against the Japanese invaders in the Khalkhin-Gol River area and for courage and heroism shown in this by an Ukase of the Presidium of the Great People's Hural of 18 August 1979, Lt Col Samdangiyn Tumurbator was awarded the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Mazimyn Ekey, lieutenant, and commander of the 4th Squadron of the 6th Cavalry Division. He was born in 1915 in Delun Somon of Bayangulgiyskiy Aymak in a herder family. In 1932, he participated in suppressing a counterrevolutionary revolt and for skillful combat operations against the rebels was awarded a presentation saber by the MNA Commander-in-Chief. In 1934, he completed the Cavalry School of the Unified Military School in Ulan-Bator. For combat accomplishments in the war against the Japanese invaders on the Khalkhin-Gol, he was awarded two Orders of the MNR Combat Red Banner. He was killed in battle on 24 July 1939.

In the area of Mount Bain-Tsagan, the squadron under the command of M. Ekey repeatedly attacked the Japanese troops which on 3 July had crossed to the western bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River and during the Bain-Tsagan battle destroyed several-score enemy soldiers.

On 24 July, Ekey with his squadron, in conducting reconnaissance in force, rapidly broke through the positions of the enemy troops which went over to the defensive and captured a Japanese officer. On the very same day, having allowed the Japanese to come within a distance of 100 m of their positions, the soldiers under Ekey's command opened up heavy small arms and machine gun fire against them. But the Japanese were able to bring up reserves. In continuing to direct the combat of the dismounted squadron, Lt Ekey ordered his soldiers not to leave the occupied positions and to decisively repel the enemy attacks. When Japanese aviation began bombing and intensive shelling of the positions

was commenced by enemy artillery, a shell fragment tore off the arm of M. Ekey. Running to the soldiers for help, he said: "Combat friends. A difficult situation has developed. But hold the enemy until the approach of the reinforcements and carry out the orders of the motherland!"

Shouting "Forward, Comrades!" the intrepid commander, regardless of his severe state, was able to rise again, intending to attack with his soldiers, but his forces abandoned him. The squadron successfully repelled the enemy attack and held the defenses.⁶

For outstanding combat accomplishments in defending the motherland against the Japanese aggressors and for heroism and courage shown in the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol, by an Ukase of the Presidium of the Great People's Hural of 18 August 1979, the MNA cavalry commander Mazimyn Ekey was awarded (posthumously) the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic.

At present, of the 12 Mongolian soldiers who are heroes of Mongolia and participated in the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol, 7 remain alive: D. Guulin, L. Dandar, Ch. Dugarzhav, D. Nyantaysuren, P. Cogdon, N. Zhamba and S. Tumurbator.

The Heroes of Mongolia who participated in the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River are honored persons of the Mongolian People's Republic. A majority of them are still working for the good of the beloved motherland and take an active part in public affairs and in indoctrinational work of the youth. They are making a worthy contribution to the construction of socialism in their country, to carrying out the extensive plans outlined by the 18th MNRP Congress and to strengthening friendship between the Soviet and Mongolian peoples and their armed forces.

FOOTNOTES

¹ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1977, pp 69-73.

² [Not in text]

³ UNEN, 19 August 1979.

⁴ Archives of the Mongolian Armed Forces, folio 4, inv. 8, stor. unit 639, sheets 4-7.

⁵ Ibid., sheets 15-17.

⁶ Ibid., sheets 17-20.

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MEMOIRS DESCRIBE EXPOSED-FLANK ADVANCE IN BALTIC IN 1944

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 24 Aug 84) pp 50-55

[Article by Lt Gen (Ret) B. Arushanyan: "We Are Advancing With an Exposed Flank"; in the autumn of 1944, B. I. Arushanyan was the commander of the XI Guards Rifle Corps]

[Text] The autumn of 1944 had arrived, a year of decisive attacks by our Armed Forces along the entire length of the Soviet-German Front. Under the powerful thrust of the Soviet troops, the enemy defenses crumbled. The enemy, fearing the "pincers," hurriedly retreated on one or another sector and from this the front line assumed at times the most unexpected configuration....

Such a situation arose in the second half of September in the Baltic a significant portion of which had already by that time been freed of the Nazi occupiers. The basic forces of Army Group North had been concentrated by the Nazi Command in the area of Riga. They were linked with the Nazi troop grouping in East Prussia by a relatively narrow strip running along the coast of the Baltic Sea. It was essential to break this "bridge" and cut off the Army Group North from the East Prussian staging area.

For this purpose Hq SHC gave the First Baltic Front the mission of shifting the basic forces from the Riga sector to the area of Shyaulyay and, in making an attack from there on the general axis of Memel (Klaypeda) and to come out on the Baltic Seacoast in the area of Palanga, Memel and the mouth of the Neman River.

The commander of the front, Army Gen I. Kh. Bagramyan, decided to make two thrusts: the main one with the forces of the four all-arms armies and one tank army from the area of Shyaulyay to Memel (Klaypeda) and an auxiliary one with the forces of the 2d Guards Army which included our XI Guards Rifle Corps, from the area of Kelme to Tilsit for covering the main thrust of the front from the south.

The XI Guards Rifle Corps with reinforcements took up the initial position for the offensive on the left, exposed flank of the army.

Operating in the zone of advance of the corps some 25 km wide were units from the enemy 548th Infantry Division. Here the main thrust on a front of 5 km was to be made by the 2d and 32d Guards Rifle Divisions from the corps with the basic portion of the reinforcements. Their aim was to break through the enemy defenses and, in exploiting the success, by the end of the day capture a line of Marni, Bargayli. The remaining front (20 km) was covered by the 264th Guards Rifle Regiment and an army mobile obstacle construction detachment. Two regiments from the 87th Guards Rifle Division and the 14th Antitank Artillery Brigade remained in the second echelon for supporting the exposed flank of the corps (and the army) in the course of the advance.

Advancing to the right was the XIII Guards Rifle Corps. To the left were the main forces of the 39th Army of the Third Belorussian Front preparing to attack from the area of Raseynyay on Taurage. The distance between the breakthrough sectors of our and the 39th Army reached 25-30 km.

In the course of the preparations for the offensive, the political bodies and party organizations of the corps carried out great work, creating among the personnel a high offensive drive and desire to crush the enemy and to liberate the entire territory of Soviet Lithuania from the Nazi invaders. Party and Komsomol meetings were held in all companies and batteries with the agenda "The Strength of the Personal Example of the Communist and Komsomol Member." The divisional newspapers came out with an appeal to clear the Soviet Baltic of the Nazi occupiers.

On 5 October before dawn an operational headquarters group and I arrived at the observation post set up on the eastern bank of the Dubysa River on a nameless elevation to the southwest of Kubyl. Everyone was waiting for the start of the offensive.

...The morning was overcast. Fog obscured the terrain. Visibility was limited. For this reason the start of the attack had to be put off until 1100 hours. This followed after a 30-minute artillery softening up the final cord of which was a volley of "katyushas." The forward battalions rose strongly to the attack. The artillery shifted its fire in depth. At the command post using binoculars or even with the naked eye we could see the infantry with the tanks reach the first enemy trench keeping close behind the exploding shells of their artillery. At this moment the corps intelligence chief Col Gorbov reported:

"Comrade general, serving together with the forward battalion is the regimental reconnaissance of the first guards regiment where the girl scout Nina Red'ko is serving. Look through the binoculars, she is the left flank of the battalion, running a little ahead of the other soldiers...."

We were greatly moved, expecting the combat results, but then also had to be concerned for the fate of a girl. For several minutes she was concealed from our field of vision, having jumped into a trench. When the battalion attacked the second trench, we saw three figures appearing from the first trench and began coming toward us. Having taken a look, Gorbov shouted:

"That is Nina Red'ko! She is leading two prisoners...."

From the brief report of the girl it was impossible to gain a full notion of the feat carried out by her. Only later did it become clear that she was the first to rise up to the attack. In the trench she had encountered two Nazis. A struggle ensued. The girl did not lose her head but by a skillful blow knocked one of them down and took the automatic from the other. Both Nazis surrendered. For this feat the brave scout was awarded the Order of Glory Second Degree.¹

The concentrated fire of our artillery forced the enemy firing points to fall silent. In benefiting from this, the forward battalions moved forward rapidly, invading the second trench and rapidly clearing it of Nazis. Then immediately committed to battle were the remaining battalions of the 1st and 82d Guards Rifle Regiments from the corps first echelon divisions. Deep in the defenses the enemy strengthened its resistance and now and then went over to counter-attacks.

Particularly stubborn combat developed on the nameless elevation with the marker 144.2. The first attack by the forward subunits of the 82d Guards Rifle Regiment of Lt Col D. F. Nosochenko were unsuccessful. In a repeat attack our infantry, supported by two batteries of self-propelled artillery and three tanks, skirted the elevation and attacked it from the flanks. With artillery support the submachine gunners mounted on the self-propelled mounts and tanks pushed up the elevation and initiated battle in the trenches. At the same time the other self-propelled units and tanks with mounted infantry rushed the enemy artillery firing positions. The mission was carried out as the elevation was taken. In this battle, the Nazis suffered great losses. A battery of 150-mm cannons and a mortar battery were destroyed as well as 4 air defense cannons, 12 machine gun nests and up to 100 enemy soldiers and officers. Some 42 persons were taken prisoner.

Also fighting heroically were the men from the other units and subunits of the corps which participated in the offensive. Let me give two examples. Even during the preparations for the offensive, the deputy commander for political affairs of the 1st Guards Rifle Regiment, Maj Marunich, entrusted the red flag to the communists, Guard Pfc Yepishkin. Before the entire company, the soldier gave a solemn promise to raise it on elev. 111.2. Yepishkin kept his word with honor. Moreover, in combat he personally destroyed 11 Nazis and having taken over a group of soldiers, repelled 3 fierce enemy counterattacks. For this and other feats performed in previous battles, Guards Pfc Mikhail Polikarpovich Yepishkin was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.²

A second example. The soldier of the second company of the 82d Guards Rifle Regiment V. I. Penzov, having seized the flag which had fallen from the hands of a mortally wounded comrade carried it to storm the second Nazi trench and raised the crimson banner on the breastworks. For this feat V. I. Penzov was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the corps assault grouping, in fighting as forward units, had broken through two positions of the main defensive enemy zone, having advanced 6-7 km.

In the evening of 5 October, the corps divisions were given the mission of developing the offensive on the following morning to the southwest on the general axis of the city of Nemokshty and by the end of the day reach the line of Yanishki, Nemokshty, Skhavdvili, Shishady. At that time we were particularly concerned by the right flank of the corps attack grouping. The problem was that our adjacent unit on the left--the 39th Army of the Third Belorussian Front--according to the plan was to start the offensive just on the following day and the enemy had an opportunity to make a counterstrike against our left flank. We felt that on 6 October, as our advance deep into the enemy defenses increased, this flank would be further extended and the danger of a counterstrike would grow. The forces assigned to support it could be insufficient. In order to settle this question once and for all I, in reassessing the situation, turned to the artillery commander, Col Yaroshenko:

"Afanasiy Semenovitch [Yaroshenko], what amount of artillery can be used for repelling a possible enemy counterstrike?"

"I have estimated," he replied, "that in addition to the artillery of the 87th Guards Rifle Division we would use the artillery supporting the 2d Guards Rifle Division, a corps artillery group and two 'katyushas' battalions which are available to us. The mobile antitank reserve of the corps should keep up with your observation post so that at any time it could be thrown in for repelling an enemy tank counterattack."

"Agreed," I said turning to the chief of the corps engineer troops, Col Kushnir:

"What actual means does the mobile obstacle construction detachment have and what can be done to increase its capabilities?"

There came a precise answer:

"According to your decision the corps mobile obstacle construction detachment consists of two companies. It has 3,000 antitank mines and 5,000 antipersonnel mines and I find this sufficient for laying obstacles on a 5-km front."

"The mobile obstacle construction detachment on vehicles with a full fuel load," I ordered, "is to move up in stages in the zone of the 2d Guards Rifle Division constantly ready to lay obstacles on the sector of a possible enemy counterstrike. There should be reliable back-up communications with the detachment."

Then I turned to the corps chief of staff, Col Glonti:

"Mikhail Varlamovich [Glonti], pass on the order to Gen Samokhvalov:³ the division's second echelon is not to be committed to battle without my permission and move it closer to the left flank of the division. The mobile antitank reserve and the mobile obstacle construction detachment of the division should also move closer to the left flank."

In addition, for the purpose of supporting the left flank, the commander of the 87th Guards Rifle Division was ordered to put one battalion in my reserve from the 264th Guards Rifle Regiment while the 536th Antitank Regiment was to be put under the commander of the 87th Guards Rifle Division.

At 2000 hours on 5 October, our units took up the initial position for a final offensive on the morning of the following day. The 261st Guards Rifle Regiment of Lt Col D. N. Goncharuk and the 262d Guards Rifle Regiment of Maj V. N. Mikhaylov which were part of the 87th Guards Rifle Division were inserted around the left flank of the 2d Guards Rifle Division and deployed with a front to the southeast for securing the left flank of the corps assault grouping from the southeast. The 264th Guards Rifle Regiment of the same division continued on the defensive on the former line, on the western bank of the Dubysa River.

During the night the corps formations by the actions of specially assigned subunits significantly improved their positions, having captured five population points and several elevations.

By dawn, we had arrived at the new observation post which the combat engineers had been able to ready to the east of Yunishki (south). From here there was a good view of the forward edge of the second line of enemy defenses and their near depth. The battle formations of our troops due to the lack of time in this instance were not so well concealed and camouflaged as on the first day of the offensive. Since virtually all the artillery had changed its firing positions during the night, ranging had to be carried out.

At 1100 hours, after a 40-minute artillery softening up, the corps troops went over to a decisive offensive. Under the cover of the fire of their artillery the infantry and tanks with the support of the self-propelled guns moved into the attack. The enemy put up stubborn resistance. Hand-to-hand engagements developed in certain areas. Finally the first trench was cleared and then the second. Then the first extended lines of the attacking subunits with the tanks crossed over the crest of the elevation and battle continued deep in the Nazi defenses.

Since the divisional commanders had reported that the attack had started, I did not summon them anymore to the telephone. The command personnel should not be taken away from the control of combat at such an intense time. From experience I knew that a moment would come when an enemy counterattack could be expected at any moment. Nevertheless, I could not remain uninformed about the events developing on the forward edge. In such instances we were aided by the corps forward observation post (PNP). In the zone of each first echelon division there was a corps PNP which was headed by an officer from the operations section of the corps staff. They all advanced in the battle formations of the advancing troops keeping up with the observation posts of the battalion commanders and they had a direct telephone link with the basic observation post of the corps commander. It was their duty to report on the situation in their area, to inform the corps commander of the situation of the forward units of their troops, enemy actions and so forth.

I will never forget what good work was done by Majs Motruk and Panchenko at the PNP. Maj Motruk particularly distinguished himself. This short, seemingly delicate man was exceptionally tenacious. He was able to excellently orient himself in the field and precisely report the situation. As soon as a crisis situation developed in one or another area, immediately the phone rang and in the receiver came his voice reporting from where, in what sector and with what

forces the Nazis were undertaking a counterattack or where they were preparing for a counterstrike. For this reason the artillery commander, Col Yaroshenko, always was able to promptly prepare a fire strike against the counterattacking enemy.

And now on the second day of the offensive, when the advancing units had crossed the crest of the elevation and were out of sight over the horizon, I was just about to order the telephone operator to call Motruk who on 6 October was in the zone of the 32d Guards Rifle Division, when the telephone rang. I picked it up. Of course, it was Maj Motruk.

"Comrade Pimenov,"⁴ he began. "Hello. Our infantry with the tanks is fighting for the elevation in quadrant 2642 and the village in quadrant 2647. The enemy is putting stubborn resistance. On the edge of the forest in quadrant 2451 I see 12 enemy tanks and assault guns and behind them up to a battalion of infantry. The direction of their movement is the northern slopes of the elevation, quadrant 2649. I feel that the enemy is preparing for a counterattack against Tolstukhin's⁵ subunits. I am continuing to observe."

"Good, Comrade Motruk. Measures to repel the enemy counterattack will be taken, continue observation."

From the neighboring slit this conversation could be heard to Col A. S. Yaroshenko. He came up to me and I showed him on the map from where and in what direction the enemy was counterattacking.

"Now I will give the orders," said Yaroshenko.

Not 2 minutes had passed when Gen N. K. Zakurenkov phoned:

"Comrade Pimenov, up to a battalion of infantry with 10-15 attacks is counterattacking from quadrant 2451 in the direction of quadrant 2649. I would request aid with 'katyushas' fire."

"Fine. I am taking measures," I replied.

Several minutes later, we heard a volley characteristic only for the "katyushas" and fractions of a second later the rockets flew over our heads. Soon the roar of their explosion reached us from behind the crest.

I phoned Maj Motruk:

"Well, what about the enemy counterattack?"

"The rocket salvo hit right in the center of the battle formations of the counterattacking enemy. There is confusion in the Nazi ranks. The divisional artillery is firing heavily at their surviving tanks. I can see our enemy with tanks approaching the counterattacking enemy group. The enemy has not accepted hand-to-hand combat and is retreating. We are pursuing it. On the battlefield are many enemy corpses and four burning tanks."

"Thanks. Continue observation. Do not get behind the battle formations of the forward units."

A minute later, Gen N. K. Zakurenkov phoned and reported that the enemy counter-attack had been driven off and the division's units were continuing their successful advance. Tolstukhin had taken the elevation in quadrant 2649 and Nosochenko had captured a group of houses in quadrant 2647.

"Make certain that the artillery does not lag behind the infantry," I ordered. "Do not reduce the rate of advance."

And so during the entire day. Until late in the evening the field telephone rang almost unceasingly....

However, let us return to a description of the course of combat. Having upset the enemy and repelled its counterattacks, the corps' formations continued to advance successfully. During 6 October, having surmounted stubborn enemy resistance and in widely employing outflanking and envelopment, without allowing the enemy to dig in on prepared lines, the 32d and 2d Guards Rifle Divisions from the corps by the end of the day had advanced another 12-14 km. Having widened the breach up to 16 km, they had captured the line of Shimaytsy, Gipoyki, Yavdizhishki. The 87th Guards Rifle Division of Maj Gen K. Ya. Tymchik, with two regiments (261st and 262d) was fighting on the line of Zhemine, Ezeklelishki with a front to the southeast, supporting the left flank of the corps and army assault grouping. Two battalions from the 264th Guards Rifle Regiment from this division were continuing to tie the enemy down on the forward line of the eastern bank of the Dubysa River. One battalion from this regiment was in the reserve of the corps commander in the area of Getskonyay.

In order to halt our advance, the Nazi Command on the very first day was forced to commit to combat all the reserves located in the tactical depth, supporting its counterattacks with tanks and assault guns. Moreover, during the night of 6 October, having felt the entire might of our attack, it began to shift the 5th Tank Division from the Riga sector to the breakthrough area of the Soviet troops.

Due to the corps' rapid advance, the enemy committed its reserves piecemeal as they arrived. For example, without waiting for the complete assembly of the 5th Tank Division, during the second half of the day of 6 October with a portion of the forces from this division the enemy twice counterattacked the left flank of our assault grouping. However due to the measures taken by us which I have already described, these counterattacks were repelled with great losses for the Nazis.

During the day of combat of 6 October, the troops from the corps routed two enemy regiments while the 1548th Battalion was completely destroyed.

In the morning of 7 October, the corps formations after a brief artillery softening up, decisively attacked the defending enemy. During the day, in repelling its numerous counterattacks and overcoming fierce resistance, by outflanking maneuvers and parallel pursuit our units did not allow it to dig in on intermediate lines.

On this day the adjacent unit on the left, the 39th Army of the Third Belorussian Front, went over to the offensive, it broke through the enemy defenses and

began to fight its way to the west. The enemy which had been on the defensive in front of a passive sector in the zone of the XI Guards Rifle Corps was now caught between our two groupings striking to the southwest and west and under the threat of encirclement began to hurriedly retreat. Having promptly spotted this retreat, units from the 87th Guards Rifle Division immediately went over to a decisive pursuit of the enemy.

Thrown back from the intermediate defensive line on the Balca River and driven out from a number of strongpoints and centers of resistance, the enemy by the end of 7 October 1944, under the pressure of the Soviet troops, was retreating to the southwest toward Taurage. It covered its retreat with rear guards from the 5th Tank Division. During this day our troops advanced 16-18 km and captured the line of Gudeli, Nemokshty. The 87th Guards Rifle Division was withdrawn to the second echelon and by the end of the day had assembled behind the left flank of the corps main forces in a wooded area to the east of Nemokshty. This became possible due to the successful advance of the adjacent unit on the left, the 39th Army. There was no longer any need to support the left flank of the assault grouping from the 2d Guards Army. The further advance of the XI Guards Rifle Corps up to the line of the Neman River was carried out in close cooperation with the adjacent units and developed at an even higher rate.

FOOTNOTES

¹ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 303, inv. 4021, file 104, sheet 19.

² Ibid., inv. 4011, file 102, sheets 18-19.

³ Commander of the 2d Guards Rifle Division.

⁴ Pseudonym for the commander of the XI Guards Rifle Corps.

⁵ Commander of the 85th Guards Rifle Regiment from the 32d Guards Rifle Division.

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LIFTING OF WEAPONS RESTRICTIONS ON POSTWAR GERMANY EXAMINED

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[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Lt Gen V. Aleksandrov: "On the History of Lifting the Restrictions on West German Weapons"]

[Text] World War II, the bloodiest in the history of mankind and initiated by Nazi Germany with the instigation of the reactionary circles of the United States, Great Britain and France, brought to imperialism completely unexpected results. Instead of eliminating the world's first socialist state there was the enormous growth of the prestige and influence of the Soviet Union on the international scene and instead of the strengthening of the positions of imperialism there was a weakening of the leading European capitalist powers, the rise of the socialist system and the collapse of the colonial empires.

With profound satisfaction the peoples of all the world received the decisions of the Potsdam Conference of the heads of states of the anti-Nazi coalition and aimed at the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, at prohibiting and halting the production of weapons, ammunition and military equipment on its territory and at destroying German military potential. However, the defeat of Nazi Germany and the sharp decline in the military potentials of a number of major European states greatly alarmed the world reaction which was fearful of the fate of capitalism.

Immediately after the end of World War II, the strategic concepts and doctrines for achieving world domination became the official program of the American government. The U.S. President H. Truman in a message to Congress in December 1945 stated: "The victory which we have won has placed on the American people the burden of constant responsibility for world leadership."¹

Having overtly laid claim to world domination and having set out to eliminate the socialist states for force of arms, the United States sharply intensified its military preparations and initiated measures to rebuild the military potentials of the imperialist powers and establish military blocs. In its policy on the German question after World War II, the United States endeavored, on the one hand, to keep the dangerous imperialist competitor under its control and, on the other, to make maximum use of FRG economic and military potential for resurrecting militarism on the German land. As a consequence of such a policy the decisions of the Potsdam Conference were not carried out and West Germany was

again assigned the role of the main military strikeforce aimed at the struggle against socialism in Europe. Thus the beginning was made to a policy of splitting the European Continent into military blocs and a policy of remilitarizing Germany.

The first military-political grouping in the region was the Western Alliance established in 1948 in accord with the Brussels Treaty. It included Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The official aim of this closed bloc was to "take the necessary measures in the event of a resumption of an aggressive policy by Germany."² However, behind this pretext was masked the plan for pooling the efforts of Western European imperialism to combat the Soviet Union, the People's Democracies and other progressive forces.

Characteristically immediately afterward the question was raised of including as members of the Western Alliance as well as the planned NATO bloc those countries against which it was supposedly aimed. An eloquent recognition of this is found in the memoirs of the English Field Mar Montgomery who was appointed the chairman of the Committee of Commanders-in-Chief of the Western Alliance: "I asked him (the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Bevin.--Author) to undertake steps in the aim of including West Germany in the Western Alliance and subsequently in the North Atlantic Pact.... I indicated to him that the member nations of the Western Alliance do not have either a sufficient number of people or the reserves to field the corresponding armed forces.... And we should possess strong forces. Without Germany, we would not have any hope of obtaining them."³

In using the financial and economic aid of the United States, West Germany in a short period of time restored the military-oriented base sectors of industry and had rebuilt its aviation, armored industries and shipbuilding.

A year after the founding of NATO, the United States officially proposed the remilitarization of Germany, having come out in favor of "the participation of German subunits and the use of German production capacity for equipping these armed forces."⁴

Encountering the concerned attitude of its Allies, the American government undertook a number of outflanking maneuvers in order by any means to arm the revanchist Bonn state. Under U.S. pressure, France put forward the so-called "Pleven Plan" which envisaged the establishing of an European defense community (EDC) and an "European Army" with FRG participation.

Former Nazi generals took an active part in discussing the plan for an "European Army." The "Pleven Plan" which, in particular, envisaged the incorporation of German brigades numbering not more than 6,000 men each in multinational divisions under a non-German command, was completely not to their liking. The counterplan put forward by them and accepted with U.S. support proposed for the establishing of 12 German divisions numbering 12,000 men each, the organizing of them in 6 army corps under a German command and the formation of a German Air Force consisting of 2,000 aircraft.

The overt intention of the Western powers of putting weapons back in the hands of those who just recently had shed blood in Europe encountered powerful

resistance from the European peoples. The movement against ratification of the treaty to establish the EDC developed in all countries and caused an acute political crisis in France the people of which thrice (in 1871, 1914 and 1940) had been the victim of German aggression. The supporters of the restoration of German militarism undertook every measure to achieve their goals. The U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, as the American historian N. Grabner has written, "in 1953 and the first months of 1954 proposed employing on France 'shock treatment,' endeavoring to force the ratification of the EDC Treaty both on the French National Assembly as well as on the French people. In expecting the rejection of the EDC by France, the U.S. Senate (88 in favor and 0 against) favored a unilateral approach by America to German rearmament. The Senate Armed Services Committee clearly stated its determination to cut off aid to France if it did not ratify the EDC Treaty.⁵ The plans of the reaction were defeated. On 30 August 1954, the French National Assembly by a majority of votes refused to review the treaty and this meant a rejection of its ratification.

Recovering from the blow dealt, the ruling circles of the United States and other countries set to salvage their thwarted plans. As a result of a carefully planned operation conducted behind the back of the peace-loving public, in October 1954, the so-called Paris Agreements were signed which confirmed the repeal of the occupation status of the United States, Great Britain and France on West German territory and provided for its membership in NATO. In accord with these, the FRG and Italy on 7 May 1955 became members of the Western Alliance after which it was changed into the Western European Union (WEU). On 5 May 1955, just 10 years after the collapse of Nazi Germany and its unconditional surrender, an official ceremony was held admitting the FRG to NATO. The path to restoring militarism on German land was open. Thus the USSR Allies in the anti-Nazi coalition celebrated the 10th anniversary of the memory of the victories of Nazism.

The accepting of the FRG into the WEU and NATO was a logical conclusion to the policy of forcing West Germany into the path of unlimited military preparations against the USSR and the other socialist countries and a policy of establishing favorable conditions for restoring the German military machine. In realizing the unpopularity of their decisions, the Western powers endeavored to passify public opinion by appending to the Paris Agreements a number of protocols which supposedly restricted FRG activities in the military area. The very fact of these attempts is rather eloquent. In this manner the United States and its partners involuntarily recognized the danger of the rebirth of German militarism. What were these purely formal limitations?

Article I of Protocol II established limits to the size and strength of the Bundeswehr which had already been set by the EDC Treaty. Although these limitations were not officially published in the press, it is known that the total size of the West German Armed Forces should not exceed 500,000 men, including 400,000 ground troops, 80,000 in the air force and 20,000 in the navy. The effective strength of the ground forces was to be 12 divisions, the air force was to have 20 air groups (around 1,350 aircraft) while the navy would have 21 squadrons (approximately 200 ships).⁶ This same article pointed out that the established "maximum limits do not serve as an obligation for any of the High Contracting Parties to increase or maintain the armed forces on these levels."⁷

However, what the protocol considered a maximum was viewed by the West German government as a necessary minimum and starting in 1956 carried out a policy of constantly increasing the size of the Bundeswehr. This fact is openly recognized in the West.

At present, according to official data, the size of the Bundeswehr is 495,000 men.⁸ To an uninformed person it may seem that the FRG has constantly followed the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreements but, in reaching such a conclusion, he would be very far from reality. The problem is that consciously endeavoring to mislead the public, the Bundeswehr command, in working out the structure of the military organization, has put military administration into a separate category and does not count this personnel in the total size of the armed forces. This numbers some 180,000 civilians the duties of which are performed by servicemen in the armed forces of other NATO countries. Thus, the actual size of the Bundeswehr is 675,000 persons and this is an obvious violation of the Paris Agreements.

In accord with Protocol III, West Germany assumed an obligation not to produce on its territory nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, long-range missiles and strategic aircraft. Construction was prohibited of combat surface vessels with a tonnage over 3,000 tons (with the exception of 8 antimissile destroyers with a tonnage of not more than 6,000 tons each) and submarines of over 350 tons (with the exception of 6 submarines up to 1,000 tons), in addition to any class of fighting ships with a nuclear propulsion unit.⁹ At the same time the FRG was able to establish a nuclear, chemical and missile industry. It was permitted to produce short-range guided missiles designed for air defense, ship-launched guided missiles with a range of not more than 70 km and armed with a conventional warhead. Subject to control was the production of artillery weapons (cannons, howitzers and mortars) with a caliber above 90 mm, tanks and their equipment, other armored vehicles weighing more than 10 tons, guided missiles, all types of mines (with the exception of antitank and anti-personnel) and bombs weighing more than 1,000 kg; fighting ships with a tonnage over 1,500 tons and launches capable of reaching a speed over 30 knots and armed with offensive weapons.¹⁰

There were also plans to establish within the WEU a special control mechanism, the Weapons Control Agency, which was to monitor the observance of the obligations assumed by West Germany.

The ostensible concern of the Western powers for restraining West German militarism could not deceive even those who usually supported any zigzags in American foreign policy. Thus, one of the American studies of those times said: "Their basic purpose (the Paris Agreements.--Author) was that they entailed the rearming of Germany and the rebirth of a German national army with certain insignificant limitations on the production of certain types of weapons and military materials. These limitations hardly lasted long."¹¹

One does not need to possess a great gift of foresight to reach such a conclusion. It is merely enough to read the text of the agreements and it is immediately clear that all the restrictions are nothing more than an empty formality which required a simple procedure for nullification. Article 3 of Protocol II

allowed a rise in the level of the armed forces above the established limits while Article 2 of Protocol III generally envisaged the listing of all restrictions for West Germany in the area of the production of weapons and military equipment in referring to the needs of NATO. This merely required petitions from the West German government to the WEU Council and a recommendation of the Supreme High Command of the NATO Joint Armed Forces. In truth, it was stipulated that for approving a final decision the WEU Council required a majority of two-thirds of the votes.¹² As subsequent events were to show, this did not cause any difficulties.

One must note the numerous stipulations and escape hatches in the text of the agreements making it possible for the FRG to easily avoid the imposed limitations. For example, in prohibiting the production of one or another type of weapon on West German territory, the agreements disregarded the possibility of purchasing these from other nations or producing them outside the FRG. In the interests of scientific research it was permitted to develop weapons components at civilian enterprises.

In concluding the Paris Agreements, Chancellor Adenauer solemnly vowed that the FRG would reject nuclear weapons. However, soon thereafter a different tune was heard. "Can it be imagined," Adenauer asked pathetically, "that the German troops in NATO be armed more poorly than the Americans; that the Americans, Italians, French, Belgians and Dutch have nuclear weapons while the German troops do not?"¹³ For greater persuasiveness, the so-called "Soviet military threat" was wheeled out.

On 25 March 1958, the Bundestag adopted a resolution which gave the government the right to arm the Armed Forces "with the most modern types of weapons," including nuclear missile. This was a flagrant violation of the Paris Agreements. The policy of connivance by the Western powers had produced its first fruit. On the basis of the adopted resolution the FRG purchased in the United States Matador, Nike-Hercules and Honest John missiles, Starfighter aircraft and other modern weapons systems for those times.¹⁴ The nation began licensed production of the F-104G Starfighter, Fiat and G-91 fighter bombers, the Noratlas military transports, the UH-1D Iroquois and CH-53G helicopters and Sidewinder missiles. West Germany gained access to modern military technology, scores of branches of American military firms were opened in the nation and Germany resumed its own military research, including nuclear and space.¹⁵ As was pointed out in the Western press, Bonn had always endeavored to gain only the most advanced military equipment capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The WEU gave Bonn a "green light" to produce constantly new types of weapons, being turned actually from a body supervising the rearmament of the FRG into a mechanism for increasing its military might and creating a staging area for aggression against the socialist commonwealth nations. The appeals from the West German government always motivated to the interests of "defending" NATO with a request to cancel or alter one or another point of the Paris Agreements assumed a regular nature. Thus, on 23 April 1958, the WEU Council gave permission for West Germany to produce antitank missiles with a firing range of up to 3 km and a little later to build a training vessel of 4,500 tons. Then came the lifting of limitations on producing destroyers with a tonnage up to 6,000 tons, submarines with a tonnage up to 1,000 tons, for purchasing antimissile destroyers and missile weapons for high-speed launches, and, finally, for acquiring nuclear artillery and the

Pershing-1A operational-tactical missiles with a firing range of 740 km which could also be armed with a nuclear warhead. The latter, incidentally, was a direct violation of the Paris Agreements which imposed a ban on long-range missiles.

By the end of the 1960's, the production of military products for the Bundeswehr once and for all moved into the hands of national military corporations. While in 1957, the share of the imported deliveries of weapons and military equipment in the orders of the FRG Ministry of Defense exceeded 60 percent, by 1969, this had dropped to 20 percent. And this occurred simultaneously with an increase over the same period in the volume of military orders from 3.3 billion DM to 9.2 billion DM.¹⁶

The 1960's and 1970's were characterized by the recreation of a national military-industrial complex in the FRG. In 1970, a Weapons Committee was formed bringing together the West German general officers with representatives of the 27 major military firms. In bypassing the limitations and bans, plans were worked out for the mobilization preparation of the national economy for war and emergency laws were approved for the event of mobilization. The West German monopolies began exporting military equipment, they began to build military enterprises in other countries and joined actively in the programs for the joint production of weapons and military equipment with France, Great Britain and Italy.

In the 1970's and 1980's, the process of revising the Paris Agreements was continued. In September 1973, West Germany was permitted to build submarines with a tonnage up to 1,800 tons and in July 1980, all limitations were lifted on the tonnage of fighting ships. The Western press viewed this ruling of the WEU Council as "the most important since World War II on the question of lifting the limitations on the rearmament of the Federal Republic." By an unanimous decision Section 5 of Appendix 3 to Protocol III of the Paris Agreements was completely cancelled. Now, as was announced from London by the Associated Press correspondent, "the West Germans can build any ships they want, in particular ocean-going military ships, large ASW ships, submarines, carriers, if they need, as well as civilian and military ships with nuclear propulsion units."¹⁷

There certainly are no doubts they want to. The West German admirals are dreaming about the ocean expanses. A FRG squadron has already made a cruise lasting many months in the Indian Ocean while the commander of the nation's Navy, Vice Adm A. Betge, without beating around the bush has announced the plans of the Bundesmarine: "We should be ready for such a development of events which would force the Western industrial nations to ensure an organized naval presence in those areas which ordinarily are not included in the sphere of operations of NATO."¹⁸

At present, as the West German magazine DIE STERN has written, the FRG has been turned into the major military forge of the world. At present, in the FRG there is virtually not a single major enterprise which does not participate in weapons production. Hundreds of medium-sized firms and thousands of smaller enterprises are working on military equipment. How many there actually are no one knows but the Agency for Military Equipment and Procurements in Koblenz is involved with more than 10,000 firms."¹⁹

Even by the end of the 1970's, the share of military production was on a level of 2 percent of the total volume of the nation's industrial production. However, the degree of militarization in the individual industrial sectors was significantly higher. Thus, the share of military production of the aviation-missile industry was 50 percent of the sector's product, for shipbuilding it was over 30 percent, for general machine building more than 5 percent and for the automotive industry over 3 percent. Some 250,000 persons are directly employed in military production and this is 3 percent of the total number of employees.²⁰

West Germany holds leading positions in the capitalist world for the production of armored equipment and artillery and firearms weapons. The lifting of the restrictions in 1980 on building fighting ships will make it possible for the FRG to hold an even stronger place in world shipbuilding.

At present, the West German military industry produces the BO-105 combat helicopters, the Leopard-2 tanks, the TP-1 Fuchs armored personnel carriers, anti-missile frigates of the "Bremen" class, missile boats of the 143A design, and the Kormoran air-to-ship missiles. Jointly with Great Britain and Italy, the Tornado fighter bombers are being produced, and with France the Alpha Jet ground attack planes, the Roland antiaircraft missile complexes as well as the Hot and Milan antitank guided missiles. Jointly with the basic Western European countries development is being carried out on future fighters, an antitank helicopter and an antiaircraft missile complex. Within national limits they are developing the main Leopard-3 tank, a submarine of the 210 design and they plan to develop a naval combat helicopter, a military transport helicopter, a future infantry combat vehicle and new missile launches. The nation has developed powerful scientific-technical and military-production facilities making it possible to develop and produce the most modern types of weapons, including nuclear, chemical and bacteriological.

As a result of the outright conspiracy of the ruling circles of the West, the Bundeswehr has become the strongest army in Western Europe. The FRG Armed Forces in the Central European Theater comprise one-half of the effective strength of the ground forces in the grouping of the NATO Joint Armed Forces [JAF], they comprise also one-half of the ground air defenses, 30 percent of the total number of the combat aircraft of the NATO Air Forces, all the NATO naval aviation and 70 percent of the ships in the zone of the Baltic Straits. In the event of mobilization, the size of the Bundeswehr within 72 hours should rise to 1.2 million men.²¹ The FRG military-political leadership will endeavor to more quickly implement the so-called "Rogers Plan" which demands from America's NATO allies the most rapid arming of their armed forces with the new generation of conventional weapons. The nation's military budget over the last 10 years has increased annually by 3 percent in real terms. Over the period from 1955 through 1984, direct military outlays by the FRG have increased by almost 8-fold (from 6.1 billion to 48.6 billion DM). The share of expenditures of the Ministry of Defense in this year was 18.9 percent of the state budget.²²

Having assumed the role of the main NATO strikeforce in Europe, West Germany has constantly endeavored to strengthen its influence in the bloc and has demanded that the allocation of superior command posts on its staffs correspond

to the present balance of forces. Upon Bonn's insistence, a new position was introduced of the deputy supreme commander-in-chief of the NATO JAF in Europe and this has been assumed by a Bundeswehr representative. As is clear from statements by the former FRG Defense Minister G. Leber, the German generals are not against assuming the No-1 position in the military organization of the North Atlantic Alliance. In the Bundeswehr ranks, the positions of the neo-Nazi and revanchist forces are growing stronger and they are openly in favor of revising the postwar frontiers in Europe. This is the natural result of the policy of remilitarizing West Germany and as a result of this a threat to peace again derives from the German land.

At the end of June 1984, the WEU Council, at the request of the FRG government, adopted a resolution on lifting the ban established for West Germany on producing bomber aviation for strategic purposes as well as long-range missiles. Thus, contrary to international agreements, the FRG has gained an opportunity to develop and deploy its own offensive types of long-range weapons capable of threatening the security of not only neighboring states but also those distant from the FRG.²³

Having achieved the adoption by the NATO bloc of a decision for "further nuclear arming" aimed at upsetting the nuclear equilibrium in Europe, the United States has set out to eliminate the next "lag," this time in the area of conventional weapons. The goal has been set of achieving indisputable superiority over the socialist commonwealth also for conventional weapons. Precisely this is the aim of the "Rogers Plan" under which the Supreme High Command of the NATO JAF in Europe demanded that the Western European member nations further increase their military outlays. It is becoming obvious that the "Rogers Plan" and the new WEU initiative are links in a single chain. They are aimed at increasing tension in Europe and at material preparations for war.

The lifting of restrictions on the production in the FRG of long-range missiles and strategic bombers again confirms the false nature of declarations on the supposed "firm restraint" on the rearming of West Germany. In viewing the FRG as the basic European support for NATO, the United States intends in the future to encourage the military preparations of West Germany, planning to put off to it a significant portion of the bloc's military outlays. Washington is aware that granting the FRG unlimited opportunities in the area of weapons production will lead to a further increase in the proportional weight of the Bundeswehr in NATO and to a strengthening of Bonn's influence. All of this will make it possible for the American leadership to utilize the increased military-political weight of the FRG to put pressure on the other bloc countries.

On the other hand, the ruling circles of West Germany, in counting on support from their NATO allies in further increasing the nation's military potential, are hatching their own far-reaching plans. Bonn has long aimed at the role of the single leader in Western Europe and is endeavoring to head the integration processes in the region in order, in acting on behalf of a united Europe, to more quickly realize its revanchist goals.

There is one other circumstance with which the West German leadership is linking its great hopes. It is a question that certain French circles, in particular

the leader of the rightist opposition, the chairman of the Party of Unification in Support of the Republic, J. Chirac, are voicing, in the expression of the Western press, the forbidden notion of allowing the FRG access to nuclear weapons. The idea of French-West German-English nuclear collaboration has long attracted Bonn. It is not surprising that the Chirac statement was met with approval on the banks of the Rhine. The conservative West German leaders F. J. Strauss, A. Dregger and J. P. Todenhofer, in expressing dissatisfaction over the question of the state of Franco-West German nuclear relations, are demanding FRG participation on the questions of French strategic planning and the establishing of European nuclear forces. The response of the West German right is understandable. It is strange that Paris prefers to forget the tragic experience of history. Such a course scarcely conforms to national security.

The decision of the WEU Council to lift the limitations on FRG production of strategic bombers and long-range missiles is a direct challenge to the entire world community which in several months will celebrate the 40th anniversary of the victory over Naziism. This is an act of outright mockery of the memory of those who gave their life to fight Naziism. Like the deployment of the new medium-range American nuclear missiles in Europe, it fits completely into the overseas scenario of a "crusade" against the socialist commonwealth nations and runs counter to the aspirations of the people.

FOOTNOTES

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- 2 P. Borcier, "The Assembly of Western European Union. Its Contribution to the Defense and Building of Europe Since 1955," 1975, p 12.
- 3 Julian Lieder, "NATO. Ocherki istorii i doktriny" [NATO. Essays on History and Doctrines], translated from the Polish, Moscow, Politizdat, 1964, p 38.
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- 5 "NATO After 30 Years," Wilmington, 1981, p 32.
- 6 J. Bellini, "French Defense Policy," London, 1974, p 81.
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- ¹¹ M. T. Florinskiy, "Integrated Europe?" New York, 1955, pp 106-107.
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- ¹³ C. McArdle Kelleher, "Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons," Columbia University Press, New York, 1975, pp 93-94.
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- ¹⁵ M. Brozka, "Die Bundesdeutsche Rüstungsindustrie," München, Bern und Grafe Verlag, 1982, pp 11-12.
- ¹⁶ MITTEILUNGEN AN DIE PRESSE, VII/110, 2 October 1970.
- ¹⁷ Associated Press, 22 July 1980.
- ¹⁸ MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 9, 1980, p 113.
- ¹⁹ DIE STERN, No 43-50, 1983.
- ²⁰ M. Lokk, X. Wolf, "Rüstungsproduktion in Westeuropa. Forschungsbericht," 1979, No 15, pp 32-33.
- ²¹ "Germany: Keystone to European Security. A Symposium," New York, 1983, pp 40-41.
- ²² L. Kölner, "Militär und Finanzen," München, 1982, p 59.
- ²³ See: PRAVDA, 13 July 1984.

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CANDIDATE DISSERTATION ON ROLE OF GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS DEFENDED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 24 Aug 84) pp 78-79

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col (Ret) M Alekseyev: "The Defense of a Dissertation"]

[Text] At the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense, a candidate dissertation was defended on the subject "The Rise and Development of the Institution of General Staff Representatives During the Years of the Great Patriotic War" (candidate I. N. Kulikov).

The dissertation pointed out that the General Staff, as the working body of Hq SHC, constantly took measures so that information on the position of the troops did not lag behind the real development of the situation on the front. This necessitated having its own representatives on the staffs of the field forces and formations of the operational army and entrusted with the following missions: maintaining constant contact of the General Staff with the troops; providing information on the situation on the fronts and providing help to the commanders and staffs of all levels in troop command; studying and generalizing combat experience; monitoring and checking the execution by commanders and staffs of the directives and orders of the Supreme High Command, the people's commissar of defense and the General Staff.

The dissertation shows the change in the organizational forms of representation: from a group of General Staff officers (1941) to a corps of officers who are General Staff representatives (from 1943). It also discloses the functional duties and work methods of the officers in the troops of the operational army by periods of the war.

The activities of the General Staff officers were diverse. In studying the situation on the front, they promptly informed the leadership of the enemy's new weapons. Their reports also devoted great attention to the questions of troop combat support and primarily the organizing and state of troop reconnaissance. Here also there were valuable conclusions and recommendations on the most important questions of preparing and conducting a battle and operation.

It was pointed out that the reports by a majority of the officers were marked by objectivity and correctness. From them it was also possible to judge the

increased professional skill of the General Staff representatives themselves, their ability to see the main thing, to draw general conclusions and to make valuable proposals and recommendations on the questions of military art and the combat employment of the troops aimed at eliminating shortcomings and improving the forms and methods of fighting the enemy.

In the activities of the General Staff officers, as was shown in the dissertation, a significant place was held by the questions of studying combat experience. Much of what they did in this area was reflected in the work of the Section (from 1944, Directorate) of the General Staff on Utilizing the Experience of the War.

In 1942, profound organizational changes were carried out in the Soviet Armed Forces. The corps system of command was restored, with the organizing of air and tank armies, tank and mechanized corps, the establishing of which acutely posed the question of organizing and improving their cooperation with the all-arms field forces and formations on the battlefields. The General Staff officers worked hard on solving the designated problem.

With the shifting of initiative on the Soviet-German Front to the hands of the Soviet Command, there was a greater amount of work for the General Staff officers who in the course of the 1943 summer-autumn campaign, in utilizing the acquired experience, successfully carried out the missions of the Headquarters representatives. They were active on each front, as a rule, as part of a group, showing tenacity and purposefulness in carrying out the set tasks.

The dissertation emphasizes that in the 1945 campaign which concluded the war, the General Staff officers provided help for the work of the command and staffs not only of our troops but also the armies of the allied states fighting on the Soviet-German Front.

The conclusions on the question raised in the dissertation point out that the positive experience of utilizing the institution of General Staff representatives in the last war merits further study and generalization.

The defense of the candidate dissertation was successfully carried out. The Specialized Council Under the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense unanimously awarded the academic degree of Candidate of Historical Sciences to I. N. Kulikov. The Higher Certification Commission Under the USSR Council of Ministers approved the decision of the Institute's Specialized Council.

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ROLE OF MILITARY HISTORY INSTRUCTION IN MILITARY SCHOOLS EXAMINED

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[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor, Maj Gen B. Panov: "The Role of Military History Disciplines in Shaping the Moral Combat Qualities of Officer Candidates and Students"]

[Text] The central place in the work and decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held by a discussion of one of the fundamental questions related to our party's activities, namely the greatest possible improvement in ideological and mass political work under the specific conditions of improving developed socialism and the sharply exacerbated international situation. Here, as was pointed out in the report of Comrade K. U. Chernenko at the plenum, "our party proceeds from the fact that the shaping of a new man is not only the most important goal but also an indispensable condition for communist construction."¹ This demand for the teachers of military history disciplines is, in essence, a combat program in their daily activities of indoctrinating highly skilled, aware military personnel who are totally dedicated to the socialist motherland.

Military history is a rich treasurehouse of the heroic past of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces. Its profound study helps the all-round broadening of the military and general viewpoint of the officers, it aids in developing thinking, in mastering the principles of modern military art and in furthering command skills. In this context the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU D. F. Ustinov, emphasized that "only on the basis of an all-round analysis of the relationship of events and the past is it possible to establish the dialectical succession in military affairs and thereby creatively improve them and raise them to a new qualitative level."² At the same time, military history is a powerful means for political indoctrination of the men and a sharp weapon in the ideological struggle against the enemies of our motherland and communism.

Consequently, the given subject plays an enormous role in the training and indoctrination of students and officer candidates. The task of the teachers of military history disciplines is to skillfully utilize it in accord with the demands of the decisions of the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the orders of the USSR minister of defense and the directives of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Along with instilling firm knowledge

of military history and the history of military art, one of the most important, key tasks is to shape high moral and combat qualities of the officer candidates and students in the process of studying these disciplines.

An analysis of the actual work of the higher military schools shows that improving the moral-political qualities of the officer candidates and students is achieved by the daily development of them in the course of teaching all the disciplines of scientific, Marxist-Leninist ideology which is the foundation of communist indoctrination. Precisely this makes the students and officer candidates the conscious political fighters capable of independently assessing social phenomena, including such a one as war, to see the relationship of current tasks with our ultimate goals and to conduct a well-argued struggle against any ideological opponents and bourgeois falsifiers.

Increased effectiveness of propaganda is also a most important demand from the decisions of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. "...Even the most vivid and interesting propaganda, the most skillful and intelligent instruction, the most talented art will not achieve its goal," as was emphasized at the plenum, "if they are not full of profound ideas closely tied to the realities of today and showing the way of our further advance."³

The designated party demands serve, in our view, as a basis for improving the methods of shaping the high moral-combat qualities of the officer candidates and students. These are fully reflected in such fundamental principles of instruction and indoctrination as communist party loyalty and scientificness, as well as in preparing the students and officer candidates for what is required in professional peacetime and wartime activities.

V. I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that instruction always has a class nature and for this reason he gave exceptional importance to the ideological focus of instruction and its party content. Thus, in a letter to students of the Kapria School, he wrote: "In any school the most important thing is the ideological and political focus of the lectures."⁴ Communist party loyalty is organically linked to the scientificness of the content of instruction and it is inconceivable without scientific objectivity in reproducing the historical process. Here a firm rule is justness of the exposition of factual material in the entire course on the history of military art (military history). Certainly, the instructor should have a profound knowledge of the material to be presented, possess high educational skills and here observe one of the most important demands points out by V. I. Lenin: "...It is essential to endeavor to establish a foundation from precise and indisputable facts on which one could rely.... In order that this be actually a foundation, it is essential to take not individual facts but the entire aggregate of facts relating to the designated question, without a single exception, or otherwise inevitably the suspicion arises and a completely legitimate suspicion that the facts have been selected or chosen arbitrarily and that instead of an objective linkage and dependence of historical phenomena in their whole, a 'subjective' concoction is being presented to justify, possibly, a dirty deed."⁵

The phenomena and events of a war (operation, combat) should be viewed by an instructor of military history disciplines not abstractly but rather in the specific conditions of the situation and with an analysis of all its aspects

(the condition and capabilities of the enemy, one's own troops, the particular features of the theater of war and other factors). Only a thorough analysis of the facts in their aggregate can lead to correct conclusions, for example, on the causes of the failures of the Soviet troops at the initial period of the war and provides an opportunity to define the role of the masses of people, classes, parties and political leaders (military leaders, commanders) in the course of the Great Patriotic War as well as disclose the development trends of Soviet military art.

The process of arming the students and officer candidates with scientific knowledge should be organically merged with the indoctrination of communist conviction, a sense of personal responsibility for defending the Soviet motherland and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth and a certainty of our victory over the aggressor if he succeeds in initiating a war. This is one of the central tasks in the teaching of military history (the history of military art). In giving lectures and in conducting exercises and seminars, by using examples of the heroism and courage of the Soviet soldiers (the defenders of the Brest Fortress and the hero cities, the Panfilov soldiers and so forth) the instructor should show the sources of Soviet patriotism and convince the officer candidates and students of the great strength of the moral and psychological preparation of the men.

In addition, the unabating ideological struggle which is a reflection of the clash between the social systems in the sphere of human conscience, brings to one of the important places the tasks of arming the students and officer candidates with profound knowledge of military history questions, wherein by using them they could successfully combat any distortions of our people's past.

In the teaching of military history disciplines, a special place should be held by the unmasking of the ideological subversion of bourgeois falsifiers on the questions of: the causes and the nature of World War II, the decisive role of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in achieving victory over Nazism and Japanese militarism, the causes of the defeat of Hitler Germany and the sources of the victory of the USSR, the role of the CPSU, the liberating mission of the Soviet Armed Forces and so forth. It is far from accidental that the bourgeois falsifiers endeavor to distort or overlook precisely these key questions. They realize that the armed clash of the sides in the Great Patriotic War represented a struggle between two opposite social systems. In the course of this, the superiority of the socialist social system over capitalism was fully apparent and this completely confirmed the truth of the conclusion drawn by the founders of Marxism-Leninism that "war will bring the final sentence to the social institutions which have lost their viability."⁶ For this reason it is quite apparent that imperialism is interested in concealing this terrible sentence of history from the masses of people.

In endeavoring to white wash the capitalist system and eliminate its blame for initiating the war, bourgeois ideologists have done everything possible to put the blame on the Soviet Union and, in drawing falsified parallels, show that under present-day conditions the threat of war supposedly derives from our country. The danger of such falsification is exacerbated at present by the conditions of the more complex international situation. For this reason, the most important task of the military historians is to convincingly unmask the

baselessness and social reactionariness of these ideological subversions. This should be carried out in lectures and seminars, in the course of any exercises in summing up, for example, the results of the development of Soviet military art by periods of the Great Patriotic War and particularly in the final seminar where one of the questions examined is the results of the Great Patriotic War and the contribution of the Soviet Union to the defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan.

For the shaping of professional-combat qualities, of great importance is the principle of teaching the students and officer candidates what will be needed in their peacetime and wartime activities. The given principle expresses the natural dependence of the instruction process upon the development of combat equipment and weapons, the organization of the Army and Navy, the development level of modern military science. It also expresses the organic link between the theory and practice of instruction. Its realization gives a practical military focus to instruction and obliges the instructor, along with giving the students and officer candidates profound knowledge in military history, to instill in them a love for the subject and teach them what is to be used and how from the rich experience of the past, particularly the experience of the Great Patriotic War and World War II, local wars and the postwar exercises in their practical work in the troops. We feel that in carrying out this task it is essential to take into account a number of procedural concepts.

The minister of defense demands that there be a close link in the military history and operational-tactical training of the students and officer candidates and the skillful use of the very rich combat experience for mastering the art of conducting combat under present-day conditions. This means that in studying one or another question on military history (the history of military art), the clearest and most profound analysis should be given to questions tied to the specialty of one or another military school, that is, the development of tactics in the higher all-arms command schools and improving the art of employing the various Armed Services (branches of troops) in combat and an operation in the military academies. It must be remembered here that one of the central questions of any subject should be to show the creative activities of the commanders and the bold, enterprising and decisive actions of the troops under the difficult conditions of a combat situation.

In the course of teaching the military history disciplines it is also important to instruct the students and officer candidates in the procedures of employing the obtained knowledge in the practice of instructing and indoctrinating subordinates. It is essential to more profoundly disclose the causal relationship of the achieving of success in combat (for example, the influence of the careful organizing of fire damage on the outcome of combat), the role of preparing the troops to carry out combat missions (including from the examples of military skill shown by Soviet soldiers in the Great Patriotic War, in subsequent exercises and so forth) and the importance of party political work under combat conditions as well as more convincingly (using numerical, actual material) show the heroic past of the Soviet people, persuading the students (officer candidates) of the succession of its best traditions.

It is essential to consider that military history is of particular importance for the Armed Forces primarily to the degree to which its data can serve modern

tasks. However, military history is not an applied science. It cannot provide ready-made recommendations suitable for any conditions. To view military history as a sum of examples the rote study of which will make it possible now to take decisions analogous to those which were taken in some instance yesterday means to try to mechanically transfer the experience of the past to modern times. This is a major error. The conditions in a war are infinitely diverse and they do not repeat themselves. The value of military history is in the creative perception of experience and examples from the past, in the ability to disclose the development patterns of the methods of waging war, an operation and combat and in its truly infinite opportunities for broadening the viewpoint of a person who has dedicated himself to military affairs. Thus, it can be said that in the course of teaching military history disciplines, chief attention must be given to developing the ability of the students and officer candidates to employ military history knowledge for profoundly understanding the present provisions of Soviet military art.

On the basis of analyzing the teaching of military history disciplines as carried out by the officers of the Main Directorate of Military Schools Under the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was pointed out that many academies and schools have achieved positive results in resolving the stated problems. In particular, attention should be given to the chairs of the history of military art at the Academy imeni M. V. Frunze and the Military Academy of Armored Troops imeni MSU R. Ya. Malinovskiy, where they widely employ such exercises as group exercises on maps as this helps to develop the operational and tactical thinking of the trainees. At the Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, the introduction into the training process of solutions to military history operational problems as an integrated form of military history training makes it possible to intensify the cognitive activities of the students and the training process for the discipline as a whole.

Since September 1982, the Kiev Higher Air Defense Radio-Technical Engineer School together with the Ukrainian State Museum for the History of the Great Patriotic War have organized exercises on the subject of the lecture series on "Courage." In these exercises the officer candidates meet with participants of the battles and learn a great deal that is new and interesting on the tenacity and heroism of the Soviet soldiers and on the life and activities of prominent Soviet military leaders and workers of the rear during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The experience of examining the questions of the participation of the officer candidates during the war years in the defense of Moscow and Leningrad in the Moscow and Leningrad Higher All-Arms Command Schools merits the greatest possible popularization.

Experience shows that the instructors, as a rule, know their subject well. However, in our view, this is not enough. Each of them should not only know the subject well but also skillfully get their knowledge across to the students, in working for their sound assimilation of the material. The instructors, particularly of military history, as practice shows, still do not always strictly approach the selecting of the study material for the exercises. Often they endeavor to relate the content of the textbook most completely and give a large amount of numerical data to the detriment of the professional focus of instruction and carrying out indoctrinational tasks. For this reason often the lectures are given without considering the future specialization of the students

and officer candidates. For example, in one of the higher schools which trains specialists for the engineer troops, the instructor, in giving a review of the general course of military operations in France during the first period of World War II, did not draw the attention of the officer candidates to a description of the Maginot Line, and thereby did not use an opportunity to increase their cognitive activities as specialists from the engineer troops. In certain higher antiaircraft missile schools, in the seminar on Subject 9 ("The Start of the Great Patriotic War..."), the basic question for the officer candidates of the Air Defense Troops "The Organization of Moscow Air Defenses" was virtually not studied. In addition, too many questions are brought up at the seminars and because of the lack of time they are examined superficially. Often an instructor spends up to 70 percent of his time on filling out the answers of the officer candidates and students and this prevents the development of the creative, independent thinking of the students.

One of the main elements in professional-combat qualities is operational-tactical (tactical) thinking. For its formation and development on the basis of military history material, it is advisable to give a portion of the lectures a special-problem focus. Here it is essential to bear in mind that not all the lectures on military history disciplines can have a special-problem nature but only those the material of which should be assimilated by the students and officer candidates on a level of "know" and "be able to." The lectures the content of which is given to the students as informative background are given using the ordinary procedures.

A special-problem focus to the exercises can be achieved by a number of methods. Initially the instructor can pose the special question in order to evoke interest in what will be set out in the lecture or familiarize the students with the history of the development of a certain problem in tactics and the method of resolving it (for example, the problem of the rapid shifting of the efforts of the troops in depth). He can also pose a question the reply to which should be given by students (officer candidates) having read the appropriate military history and memoir literature.

In seminar exercises, in order to intensify the cognitive activities of the students and develop their creative operational-tactical thinking, it is essential to systematically pose special-problem questions and tasks. The nature of these assignments can vary. For example, the student is asked to apply the well-known thesis of Marxism on the dependence of tactics upon weapons to any specific operation of the Great Patriotic War and analyze the development of battle formations, the methods of breaking through enemy defenses and so forth.

Practice shows that problem-oriented instruction helps in more successfully developing the students' (officer candidates') ability to analyze military history phenomena and events and derive the main thing from them. Such instruction contributes to the development of independent judgments, the ability to profoundly understand historical events as well as to pose new questions and resolve them independently.

There must also be a more attentive approach to such an aspect of the instructor's work as thinking through and posing not only the educational but also the indoctrinational goals of an exercise. An instructor who focuses attention

solely on assimilating the knowledge but forgets the indoctrinational impact of instruction reduces its effect and the activity of the students and officer candidates in the study process, since there are rich opportunities to be found in the integrated carrying out of training and indoctrinational tasks.

Indoctrination is a protracted process. Naturally, in a single exercise it is impossible to instill the required qualities in the students. But individual elements in the impact of the general system of indoctrinational goals can be achieved. However, it also happens that indoctrinational goals are posed by the instructor but no indication is given as to the means and methods by which these goals can be achieved at the exercises, in the procedural studies and the plans for carrying them out. Although practice has shown that the skillful determining and achieving of indoctrinational goals in exercises contribute significantly to the development of combat qualities which we endeavor to instill in the course of studying military history, namely: loyalty to military duty and the military oath, discipline, courage, self-sacrifice, a high sense of responsibility for the assigned work area and so forth.

The mass information and propaganda media are a powerful tool of ideological influence. They, as was pointed out in the materials of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "are an effective tool of communist indoctrination...."⁷ On this level a further improvement in the methods of employing all the existing teaching devices in the course of teaching military history disciplines and greater visibility in instruction should become one of the central tasks for the instructors. The importance of resolving the given problem stems from the Leninist thesis that vital contemplation, that is, sensation and perception, are the start of any cognition.

The main purpose of visual aids in instructing the students and officer candidates on the questions of the history of military art is to develop in them objective and concrete notions of the nature of one or another previous war (operation, battle), of the methods of the combat employment of the various Armed Services, branches of troops and special troops, the weapons and combat equipment, that is, to put it figuratively, to try to reproduce the specific situational conditions under which combat occurred and military art developed. The timeliness of this task under present-day conditions has also increased because the present generation of students was born and grew up after the war and does not have combat experience.

Because of scientific-technical progress and the qualitative changes in military affairs, in teaching practices the role of screen devices has increased significantly such as slides, film strips and documentary and news film shorts and films. These devices possess definite advantages as they make it possible to show subjects, phenomena and processes in movement and development, to reproduce the specific conditions under which combat occurred and demonstrate what is inaccessible for a direct observer (the explosion of a nuclear charge, the flight of a missile and so forth). In addition, they also listen to phonographs with recordings of speeches by prominent political and military leaders.

However, in focusing on the new visual aids, it would be wrong to abandon many old ones which have been tested by years of teaching practice. It is a question of diagrams making it possible to more visibly simulate in the minds of the

students and officer candidates one or another operation (combat) and to show the development of military art in one or another period. There is also the classroom blackboard which must be used for explaining various questions. Also of important significance is the demonstrating of combat weapons, equipment, various engineer works and so forth, particularly in visiting museums and conducting field military history trips. Thus, the integrated use of visual aids in the educational process, in our view, is an inseparable demand in the course of studying the course of military history and the history of military art. It is also important that each time, in preparing for the exercises, the instructor think out in detail what technical devices and what visual aids he will be using for what purpose, when and how for achieving the goals of indoctrinating high moral-combat qualities in the students and officer candidates.

In carrying out the tasks of shaping the moral-combat qualities of the students, an important role is played by the ability of the instructor to arouse in them a desire to study military history and the history of military art independently and more profoundly and to instill a taste for reading military history periodicals and memoir literature. In certain VUZes for these purposes they have established military history circles and are working out a range of abstracts on the most crucial problems of military history. Practice shows that these forms develop logical thinking and independence of judgment and cause a desire to study the subject more profoundly.

Thus, the search for and introduction of effective methods for shaping high moral-combat qualities of the officer candidates and students in the course of studying military history disciplines is an urgent demand of today. Precisely such an approach will make it possible to carry out the tasks of developing the new man and train highly skilled military personnel who are totally dedicated to the Communist Party and Soviet government and are capable of enduring the greatest hardships for the sake of victory over any aggressor.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 14-15 iyunya 1983 g." [Materials of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, 14-15 June 1983], Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, p 27.
- ² D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 389.
- ³ "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo....," p 7.
- ⁴ V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 47, p 194.
- ⁵ Ibid., Vol 30, pp 350-351.
- ⁶ K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 11, p 551.
- ⁷ "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo....," p 43.

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BOOK REVIEW: ROLE OF GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS IN WORLD WAR II

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 24 Aug 84) pp 86-87

[Review by Candidate of Historical Sciences I. Kulikov of the book "Dokladyvayu v General'nyy shtab" (I Report to the General Staff), by N. D. Saltykov, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1983, 252 pages]

[Text] The book published by Voenizdat by Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent, Maj Gen (Ret) N. D. Saltykov analyzes one of the little-known aspects in the history of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the activities of the General Staff officers on the front during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

"The General Staff officer....," writes N. D. Saltykov, himself one of the first to be appointed to this position. "At the same time this had an incomprehensible and strange sound. In the Red Army there was no such service and they have not prepared for it. The very concept of an 'officer' for us was something long back in the past. No one imagined what this position should be and what it would require from us. We prepared to leave for the front in order to fight, carrying out the obligations imposed by our position as unit commanders and chiefs of staffs. Such service was understandable and we had been taught this. Each student had command or staff experience. Now something completely new had been proposed...." (p 6).

The General Staff officers, in being in the operational army, in the troops directly on the front, carried out responsible duties. Their service was difficult not only due to the great physical strain but chiefly due to the newness of the tasks posed for them from the very outset and because of the lack of any experience. There were not even any provisions or instructions which would define the functional duties and rights of the General Staff officers. All the questions had to be settled independently, relying on one's own knowledge and the help of senior comrades and gradually find the main element in the assigned job and the very method of approaching the solution to constantly arising problems. The author thoroughly analyzes all of this, disclosing by concrete examples the difficult and diverse activities of the General Staff officers, particularly during the first period of the Great Patriotic War.

The book shows, and this is very important, that the missions of the General Staff officers were not restricted merely to participation in resolving various

questions in the field. They also consisted in submitting reports to the General Staff on the developing situation on the given sector of the front as well as proposals aimed at improving the forms and methods of the combat employment of the troops and the systems of their command and control.

Maj Gen N. D. Saltykov gives not only the positive examples of service by the General Staff officers. He carefully traces how this service developed in the course of the war and critically analyzes the major shortcomings which occurred in its development. Thus, in time the initially adopted structure of the institution of General Staff officers headed by a group of officers as the command and control body outlived its effectiveness. This group which existed autonomously within the General Staff became simply a transfer level which held up the reports of the officers from the front. The value of these reports was naturally reduced and at times completely eliminated. "The group did not carry out its tasks and became an unnecessary superstructure..." (p 174). The author shows in detail how a reorganization was carried out in 1943 in the service of the General Staff officers considering the experience gained and how this subsequently influenced the improvement in the entire command and control system of the Armed Forces under the conditions of the major change which had begun in the course of the war.

A merit of the reviewed book is that it has been written in a lively and interesting manner and in a good literary language. Its content is anchored against the background of the historical events of the war. The book briefly describes a large number of the General Staff officers and generals as well as the persons of the superior command personnel whom the author met on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

The book "Dokladyvayu v General'nyy shtab" reflects rather completely the activities of the corps of General Staff officers and shows their carrying out of responsible tasks in the sphere of troop control by maintaining a constant vital link of the General Staff with the field forces of the operational army and providing information on the situation on the most important strategic sectors. It shows their control over the carrying out of superior-level directives in the field, over the condition and actions of the troops as well as the providing of aid to the command, the study and generalizing of the war's experience.

At the same time, the book does have individual shortcomings and inaccuracies which certainly do not reduce its value as a whole. Among such flaws one might mention a description of the selection of candidates for the position of General Staff officers in the presence of Lt Gen N. F. Vatutin (p 5). It is reliably known that the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lt Gen N. F. Vatutin on 1 July 1941 had already been appointed to the position of Chief of Staff of the Northwestern Front and returned to Moscow for a brief period only in 1942. For this reason, in August-September 1941, N. F. Vatutin could not have been in Moscow.

In speaking about the structure of the group of General Staff officers in 1942-1943 (p 144), it must be said that the missions established according to the type existing in the operations headquarters were headed not by chiefs but rather by senior assistant chiefs of the group of officers.

An erratum has been made on page 204. The partial offensive operation by the Separate Maritime Army on the Kerch Peninsula was conducted in January 1944 and not in 1943.

As a whole, the book "Dikladyvayu v General'nyy shtab" undoubtedly will cause a positive response among the readers, particularly among the postwar generation of our officer corps. It is valuable not only in the fact that this is a lively narration by a direct participant of the Great Patriotic War but is still another page in the chronicle of the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces showing the experience in establishing the service of General Staff officers.

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NEW BIBLIOGRAPHIC INDEXES ON GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 24 Aug 84) pp 88-90

[Article by Ye. Malanina: "New Auxiliary Scientific Indexes on the History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945"]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945 is one of the most important subjects of Soviet historical science. Tens of thousands of books and articles are devoted to it published both in the central and the local publishing houses ["izdatel'stvo"]. The bibliographic study of the history of the Great Patriotic War started during the very first war year and has continued up to now. Its basic results have been set out in review articles dealing with the bibliographic indexes published during the period from 1941 through 1979.¹ At the same time, broad circles of readers are less informed about the auxiliary scientific indexes which have appeared in 1980-1983. The current article deals with these.

The most significant of the bibliographic aids which have been published in recent years are those published by the central institutions and libraries such as the USSR History Institute, the Institute for Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION) of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the State Public Historical Library (GPIB) of the RSFSR as well as those which have been published in the Union autonomous republics of our nation by the Belorussian State Library imeni Lenin, the Lvov Scientific Library imeni Stefanik and the Republic Library imeni Krupskaya (Bashkir ASSR).

The subjects of the auxiliary scientific indexes vary and include the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet rear and so forth.

Works by prominent leaders of the CPSU and Soviet state are an important component part of the literature in the indexes. A significant place is held by books and pamphlets of a research nature as well as periodical publications. In 1980, there was published the "Ukazatel' vazhneyshikh resheniy partii i pravitel'stva, prinyatykh vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Index of Major Party and Government Decisions Adopted During the Great Patriotic War].² It included the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee as well as the decrees, laws and ukases of the Soviet government adopted during the period from 22 June 1941 through 4 September 1945.

The bibliographing of military memoir literature has continued. Thus, in 1982, there was the second issue of the annotated index of military memoir literature "O voyne, o tovarishchakh, o sebe. Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna v vospominaniyakh uchastnikov boyevykh deystviy" [On the War, on Comrades and on Oneself. The Great Patriotic War in the Memoirs of Combat Participants].³ The index included 828 books published in the central and local publishing houses from 1975 through 1981. Among them were the memoirs of representatives of the Ground Forces (682 titles), the Air Forces (126 titles) and the Navy (74 titles).⁴

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, many thousands of military men were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Literature on them as well as the winners of the Order of Glory of all three degrees has also been reflected in bibliographic aids.

In 1981, there was published the index "SSSR v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny (iyun' 1941 g.--sentyabr' 1945 g.). Geroi fronta i tyla" [The USSR During the Years of the Great Patriotic War (June 1941--September 1945). Heroes of the Front and Rear].⁵ This was the third volume of the general history index "Istoriya SSSR" [History of the USSR].⁶ It brought together the literature on 10,600 heroes of the front including book and journal publications over 1941-1967. The index included letters, diaries, autobiographies of war participants, memoirs about them, bibliographic information, excerpts from the award sheets, photographic materials, bibliographic aids; a total of 1,881 titles. These included materials on the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet State, prominent military leaders as well as political workers of the Soviet Army and Navy. The publications on the representatives of the Ground Forces, Air Forces and Navy were put into independent sections. The index also included literature on the participants in the struggle in the enemy rear and workers of the national economy and culture who came from individual areas.

The June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out: "To shape and raise the spiritual needs of man and to actively influence the ideological, political and moral make-up of the individual are a most important mission for socialist culture."⁷ Soviet fine art plays an enormous role in the heroic and patriotic indoctrination of the workers, particularly the youth. In this context it is hard to overestimate the importance and significance of the monuments, dioramas and panoramas devoted to the Great Patriotic War and to the great feat of the Soviet people in the patriotic indoctrination of the youth and the men of the Soviet Army and Navy. The USSR Academy of the Arts and the Institute for Painting, Sculpture and Architecture imeni Repin have prepared a new issue of the index "Memorial'nyye ansambli i pamyatniki na territorii SSSR, posvyashchennyye Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [Memorial Ensembles and Monuments on the Territory of the USSR Devoted to the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945].⁸

One of the major areas of Soviet historical science is a thorough elucidation of the sources and patterns of the labor feat of the Soviet people, the political, organizational and economic activities of the Communist Party in the rear and the ways of achieving the economic victory of the USSR over Naziism. This is the subject of the index put out by the USSR History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the RSFSR State Public Historical Library "Tyl

Sovetskogo Soyuza v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945" [The Rear of the Soviet Union During the Years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945].⁹

The index includes almost 4,000 titles of books, pamphlets and articles (from magazines and collections) as well as author resumes of dissertations, theses and texts of reports at scientific conferences over 1965-1977. They show the activities of the CPSU as the inspirer and organizer of the economic victory of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War. A separate section brings together literature on the rebuilding of the national economy in the areas liberated from Nazi occupation.

Bibliographic aids on the life and struggle of the Soviet peoples during the period of the last war are also being published by the oblast, kray libraries and the state libraries of the Union and autonomous republics. Among them one should mention the indexes on the republics as a whole and the special ones. Thus, Belorussia is continuing to publish the current bibliographic index "Belorusskaya SSR v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza (1941-1945 gg.)" [The Belorussian SSR During the Years of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (1941-1945)].¹⁰ Here also they have published a retrospective bibliographic index "Belorusskaya SSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuza (1941-1945 gg.)" [The Belorussian SSR in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (1941-1945)]¹¹ where they have recorded the books and journal articles for 1941-1971 (a total of 3,466 titles in Russian, Belorussian and the other languages of the Soviet peoples). Of great interest for the military historians is the section on the liberation of Belorussia by the Soviet Army troops. It has reflected the literature on the field forces and formations which participated in the liberation of the republic.

The Lvov Scientific Library imeni V. Stefanik has prepared the index "Zapadnyye oblasti USSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg." [The Western Oblasts of the Ukraine in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945].¹² The compilers having included in it materials in Ukrainian and Russian published in 1971-1978 (books, articles from collections, magazines, the central and republic newspapers as well as bibliographic indexes, a total of 1,215 titles).

The Union and autonomous republics have published indexes devoted to the local Heroes of the Soviet Union. For example, the index "Nashi zemlyaki--Geroi Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Our Compatriots--Heroes of the Soviet Union]¹³ published in the Bashkir ASSR includes over a thousand titles of books and articles on 266 Heroes of the Soviet Union. The index considers the literature over 1941-1980 in Russian and Bashkir languages and published by the central and local publishing houses.

It is essential to point out that the literature in the listed bibliographic indexes has been systematized in accord with the periodization generally adopted in Soviet historical science for the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The names of the sections correspond to the literature shown in them. The sections in the bibliographic indexes are located in accord with the logic of analyzing the contents of the subject. All the designated bibliographic aids have a well elaborated auxiliary scientific apparatus including a name index, a geographic name index, a list of sources used in compiling the index and so forth.

All the designated indexes substantially contribute to the holding of auxiliary scientific bibliographic aids which contribute to a thorough study of the history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945. They undoubtedly will provide great help to the librarians of the cultural and educational institutions of the Soviet Army and Navy in preparing for the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War.

The flood of literature on the history of the last war is constantly growing and broadening. The research has been supplemented by new works and documentary publications which at times bring out unknown pages in the chronicle of the great battle against Nazism. In this context the bibliographers of the nation are confronted with the difficult and honorable task of ensuring the further elaboration of the bibliography of the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ See: M. Ye. Kireyeva, "The Bibliography of the Great Patriotic War," VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1965, pp 99-102; A. O. Zil'berman, "The Great Patriotic War in Bibliographic Publications," ISTORIYA SSSR, No 3, 1980, pp 162-166; N. M. Cheremisina, "Bibliography of the History of the Great Patriotic War," SOVETSKAYA BIBLIOGRAFIYA, No 5, 1965, pp 18-27; N. M. Cheremisina, "The History of the Great Patriotic War in Bibliographic Aids," SOVETSKAYA BIBLIOGRAFIYA, No 3, 1975, pp 76-86; N. M. Cheremisina, "Indexes of Literature on the Great Patriotic War," SOVETSKAYA BIBLIOGRAFIYA, No 2, 1980, pp 65 71 and so forth.
- ² Ye. N. Morozova and Yu. K. Strizhkov, "Ukazatel' vazhneyskikh resheniy partii i pravitel'stva, prinyatykh vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Index of Major Party and Government Decisions Adopted During the Great Patriotic War], in two editions, Moscow, 1980.
- ³ "O voyne, o tovarishchakh, o sebe. Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna v vospominaniyakh uchastnikov boyevykh deystviy. Annotirovannyi ukazatel' voyenno-memuarnoy literatury (1975-1981)" [On the War, on Comrades and on Oneself. The Great Patriotic War in Memoirs of Combat Participants. Annotated Index of Military Memoir Literature (1975-1981)], No 2, compiled by P. K. Ogarev and M. K. Sekirin, Kiev-Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, 256 pages (in publication since 1977); V. I. Yezhakov, P. K. Ogarev and M. K. Sekirin, "O voyne, o tovarishchakh, o sebe. Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna v vospominaniyakh uchastnikov boyevykh deystviy. Annotirovannyi ukazatel' voyenno-memuarnoy literatury (1941-1975 gg.)" [On the War, on Comrades and on Oneself. The Great Patriotic War in the Memoirs of Combat Participants. Annotated Index of Military Memoir Literature (1941-1975)], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1977, 240 pages.
- ⁴ For more detail see: G. Tugusova, "On War, on Comrades and on Oneself," VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1983, p 90.
- ⁵ "SSSR v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny (iyun' 1941 g.--sentyabr' 1945 g.). Geroy fronta i tyla" [The USSR During the Years of the Great Patriotic War (June 1941-September 1945). Heroes of the Front and Rear], L. B. Vinogradova,

I. P. Doronin and G. M. Markovskaya ("Istoriya SSSR. Ukazatel' sovetskoy literatury za 1917-1967 gg." [History of the USSR. Index of Soviet Literature for 1917-1967], Vol 3, History of Soviet Society, No 4, Book 2), Moscow, Nauka, 1981, 215 pages.

- 6 "Istoriya SSSR: Ukazatel' sovetskoy literatury za 1917-1952 gg." [History of the USSR: Index of Soviet Literature for 1917-1952] (edited by K. S. Simon), Moscow, 1956-1958, Vols 1-2.
- 7 "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 14-15 iyunya 1983 g." [Materials of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, 14-15 June 1983], Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, p 47.
- 8 "Memorial'nyye ansambli i pamyatniki na territorii SSSR, posvyashchennyye Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg. Bibliograficheskiy ukazatel'" [Memorial Ensembles and Monuments on the Territory of the USSR Dedicated to the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Bibliographic Index], No 3. Belorussia (USSR Academy of the Arts, Institute for Painting, Sculpture and Architecture imeni Repin, Scientific Library). Compiled by V. G. Khol'tsova. Leningrad, 1980, 48 pages (in publication since 1977); No 1-2 RSFSR, 1977; No 2 the Ukraine, 1978.
- 9 "Tyl Sovetskogo Soyuz v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945. Ukazatel' sovetskoy istoricheskoy literatury za 1965-1977 gg." [The Rear of the Soviet Union During the Years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Index of Soviet Historical Literature for 1965-1977], in four issues (compiled by N. A. Khrustova, D. Yu. Drozdovskaya, Ye. N. Morozova, Ye. G. Shaposh), Moscow, Izd. in-ta istorii SSSR, 1980.
- 10 "Belorusskaya SSR v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuz (1941-1945 gg.): Bibliograficheskiy ukazatel'" [The Belorussian SSR During the Years of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (1941-1945): Bibliographic Index] (State Library of the Belorussian SSR imeni Lenin, Book Chamber), Belorussia, Minsk, by half-years.
- 11 R. M. Chigireva, E. M. Levko, "Belorusskaya SSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuz (1941-1945 gg.): Bibliograficheskiy ukazatel' literatury (1941-1971 gg.)" [The Belorussian SSR During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (1941-1945): Bibliographic Index of Literature (1941-1971)], Minsk, 1980, 299 pages.
- 12 L. I. Il'nitskaya, "Zapadnyye oblasti USSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-1945 gg.: Ukazatel' literatury za 1971-1978 gg." [The Western Oblasts of the Ukraine During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945: Index of Literature for 1971-1978], Lvov, Izd. L'vovskoy nauchnoy biblioteki, 1980, 176 pages.
- 13 R. M. Gimalitdinova, R. Z. Sharafutdinova, "Nashi zemlyaki--Geroi Sovetskogo Soyuz: Bibliograficheskiy ukazatel' literatury" [Our Compatriots--Heroes of the Soviet Union: Bibliographic Index of Literature], Ufa, 1981, 116 pages.

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VOLGA MILITARY DISTRICT DISCUSSES MERITS OF HISTORY MAGAZINE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 24 Aug 84) p 91

[Article by Maj Gen F. Yemel'yanov and Lt Col D. Mikhaylov: "From the Reader Conference of the Headquarters of the Volga Military District"]

[Text] In opening the conference on 22 May 1984, the district Chief of Staff Lt Gen V. V. Zhdanov gave positive praise to the article of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL and emphasized that the authors of the articles published in it regularly share the experience of the Great Patriotic War and promptly treat the questions of military history and the history of military art as well as the problems of party political work and the ideological struggle at the present stage.

The generals and officers who spoke at the conference made a number of requests of the journal.

Maj Gen I. M. Titov felt it necessary to more widely take up on the journal's pages the questions of the moral factor and the ways of strengthening this as well as the questions of organizing party political work to indoctrinate the men in a spirit of friendship and military comradeship, Soviet patriotism and internationalism as well as strengthening the moral-political potential of the troops.

Col I. V. Kappalov voiced a request to further continue propagandizing the military history heritage of V. I. Lenin, his immortal ideas on the defense of the socialist fatherland, his theses and advice on strengthening the economic and defense might of our nation and to more widely take up the experience of the uniting of the fraternal peoples in the socialist commonwealth countries into a single military-political union. This task, the speaker pointed out, has assumed particular timeliness in line with the 30th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact.

Col I. A. Pushnov, in speaking about the importance of the problem of combating the bourgeois falsifiers of history, drew attention to the regularity and timeliness of such materials. He voiced a request to publish more articles on the experience of organizing counterpropaganda work on military history problems as well as on the necessity of further intensifying the struggle against the falsifiers of history.

Lt Col S. G. Drozdetskiy feels it advisable to pay more attention to the questions of the organizing of combat support in the NATO troops as well as troops in the course of local wars and military conflicts.

Col L. P. Sakhotskiy in his comments voiced a request that more attention would be given on the journal's pages to treating the questions of close combat considering historical experience.

Maj Gen Avn I. N. Krutov feels that the journal's pages should more thoroughly analyze the questions of organizing the training of flight personnel in the military aviation schools as well as the methods of organizing and maintaining cooperation between aviation and the ground forces following the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Maj Gen V. V. Yermolenko voiced a request to publish more materials on the combat employment of the rocket troops and artillery in local wars and cooperation between the all-arms and artillery units (subunits) in all-arms combat.

Maj Gen G. A. Samoylenko noted the utility and value of articles on the combat employment of Air Defense Troops. In his opinion, in the articles analyzing one or another operation, the questions of air defense should be more widely dealt with, particularly in the course of regrouping troops by rail or under their own power.

Maj Gen A. P. Yuklyayev voiced a request to continue publishing articles on the combat experience of mobile groups in constantly taking up the questions of organizing and providing their rear support.

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